Part I
Hamas, status as the party in control of the Palestinian
Authority has turned the tables in the Israeli political
arena. Previous plans have become irrelevant for lack of a
proper partner on the Palestinian side. Acting Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert was forced to admit that with the swearing-in of
the Palestinian parliament, the Palestinian Authority turned
into a Hamas Authority.
Israel will have to respond to this new reality in the way of
its choosing. The American government has taken a hard stance
against recognizing the Palestinian upheaval and against any
negotiations with Hamas unless it changes its declared
goals.
After years of continual frustration with Arafat's games and
the fighting of the Intifadah, and after a number of months
in which the illusion of a moderate, rational Palestinian
government had been built up, it has become clear that we are
faced again with a dead end. Even the perpetual optimists
such as Peres fail to see the light at the end of the
tunnel.
Suddenly we are again powerless, empty-handed, and
helpless.
The extremes in the course followed by Israel, from the
euphoria and arrogance of 1967 to the political depression
and despair of 2006, illustrates the process of a national
manic-depressive illness.
*
What happened in Iyar, 5727 (1967) Israel rapidly conquered
the Sinai, Golan Heights, Yehuda and Shomron, and increased
its territory to an unprecedented extent. An atmosphere of
euphoria enveloped all. The addition of the occupied
territories ignited the imagination of a broad spectrum of
political personalities from the Right and the Left, who saw
a breakthrough in the fulfillment of the Zionist dream.
Everything looked rosy. The military achievement was viewed
as a pure political success.
No one thought that these newly-conquered territories would
cause ceaseless headaches. No one considered them an
unsolvable problem that could cause the shedding of more
Jewish blood and darken the political and economic situation
of the State of Israel for many years.
Ha'aretz (18 Sivan 5748/1988), looking back, depicted
the drunkenness of the senses that affected personalities
from all the social strata after the Six Day War. Amos Kenan,
a journalist known for his extreme dovish position, spoke
then enthusiastically about Yitzhak Rabin (the Chief of Staff
of the IDF) as a "hero of Israel" and about the war as the
"true War of Independence that we waited nineteen years for,
which will bring us back to the spirit of 1948." He expressed
his amazement at the conquest of the territories of the
"Promised Land."
Amnon Rubinstein, of Meretz, wrote back then: "The demand to
return the territories to this enemy who seeks our
destruction, is like a demand to give him weapons and
ammunition. People will understand this analogy. And if they
don't, they'll adapt to the new map. The new facts combined
with the recognition of our just cause will create a new
reality."
The exhilaration about the conquest overwhelmed everyone.
Moshe Dor, the poet, spoke about the "syllables of the
explicit name (sheim hameforash): Eretz Yisrael . .
."
Not to mention Yitzhak Tabenkin, the head of the Kibbutz
HaMeuchad movement, who wrote: "The lesson of the war,
without illusion, is the creation of new realities in
settlement . . . the slogan of returning territories for
peace is a serious mistake," or the author Chaim Hazaz
(Davar): "Greater Israel is a historical
necessity."
Dr. Hertzel Rosenblum was especially entranced by the success
of sheer force, which very much typified policies of the
past, and praised the IDF for revealing the "Herculean
powers" of the nation: " . . . and of course, Yitzhak Rabin
did this more than all our men of spirit, so that he should
be not just a doctor but also a professor of philosophy and
cognition."
In the National Religious camp there was a special awakening
that took on a fiery Messianic fervor. The term "beginning of
the Redemption" was no longer sufficient; they spoke of the
actual "Messianic Days." New holidays and specially- composed
prayers came out from the NRP's printing presses in wholesale
quantities. They saw the "liberation" of the territories as a
sign of the success and righteousness of the entire Zionist
path.
Only in the botei midroshim of the "old generation"
did things remain in perspective. They gave thanks to
HaKodosh Boruch Hu for the miracles, but at the same
time sought to shake off the feeling, so prevalent in those
days, that — "My strength and the might of my hand made
me all this wealth." They weren't impressed by the State's
territorial conquest, whose future was cloudy and no one
could know what tomorrow would bring.
Maran HaRav Shach gave a talk to students just after the Six
Day War and told them: "The Torah says [we must desist from
aveiros so that], `The land shall not vomit you out.'
The Redemption, or even a beginning of the Redemption, cannot
come about through the type of deeds for which the land would
vomit us out. The confusion is so great that it's impossible
to talk about this, and maybe here is the only corner where
it is possible to speak about it."
*
The first sobering up from the drunkenness of the Six Day War
came on Yom Kippur of 1973, when the Egyptian Army trampled
over the achievement of the previous war in the southern
front, at the cost of hundreds of fallen soldiers
Hy'd, and broke the spirit of Israeli society.
Suddenly the conquest of Sinai seemed to be a distressing
yoke, which brought additional war and bloodshed. It now
became clear that all the years Egypt had not agreed to
negotiate with Israel, even for significant political and
territorial concessions, because of the "shame" of its defeat
in the Six Day War. That shame had to be erased by means of a
terrible war that left thousands of Jewish families
bereaved.
David Pedahtzur wrote about research that investigated
Sadat's motivation for the Yom Kippur War and his refusal to
answer offers of peace and negotiations before the war.
One month after he arrived in Jerusalem to announce his
willingness to make peace with Israel, Sadat said in an
interview with the Lebanese paper El-Chawadat: "Those
who search for the secret of the Egyptian peace movement are
forgetting one very important fact. Egypt brought back its
cultural dignity. When we suffered a defeat in 1967, we were
humiliated and couldn't speak about peace. However, after our
victory in the War in October in which we avenged the defeat,
the hatred came to an end."
Pedahtzur added that Sadat revealed to Israeli journalists in
Washington, after signing the peace agreement with Israel,
that he had rejected a Soviet offer to meet with Prime
Minister Golda Meir in Tashkent two years before the Yom
Kippur War, "because at that time we were humiliated after
the 1967 War, and Golda would have translated that defeat
into the conditions of the treaty," Sadat said. From the
Egyptian point of view, Sadat explained, the process that
began with his trip to Jerusalem could not have begun before
the 1973 War, "before the restoration of Egyptian honor."
Sadat's wife also explained in a media interview that the
October War was necessary to rehabilitate Egypt's honor:
"Sadat needed victory in another war in order to open the
negotiations on an equal footing. As an Arab, he wasn't
willing to sit with Israel and feel inferior."
During the '73 War, the Egyptian Tufik El-Chakim wrote with
unconcealed pride: "We have overcome the defeat. Whatever the
results of the battles will be, the most important thing is
the leap ahead . . . we're breathing clean air, air of
freedom and liberty. This is the true meaning of victory."
End of Part I
