Introduction
There are many areas of life where waiting in line is
unavoidable. When there are a number of applicants for
treatment, for services or for assistance, they are usually
attended to on a first-come-first-served basis. This article
deals with whether and under what circumstances, it may be
justified to put a later arrival ahead of others in line. In
the course of the discussion, the halachic basis for the
whole idea of waiting in line is examined.
First, some common questions relating to queue-jumping.
1. May one accede to the request of a sick patient, whose
condition is not dangerous, to put him ahead of other
patients who are waiting in line?
2. May one move a patient to the front of a queue of
people who are waiting for minor surgery, e.g. hernia or eye
operations, when it is certain that the postponment will not
cause any danger to the others?
3. Reuvein tenders a request for government assistance,
or for a loan from a gemach, and is told that he must
wait in line. Since he is friendly with the clerk or the
gabbai who processes the applications, Reuvein asks
his friend to put him at the front of the line. May his
friend grant this request, even though it will certainly
mean further delay for others in having their needs
met?
4. Reuvein just needs to buy a stamp from the teller at
the post office, while all those in front of him in line
have lengthier business to conduct. May the teller accede to
Reuvein's request to sell him his stamp first?
5. Reuvein is hurrying to shacharis, but he must
first bring home some groceries. When he comes to the cash
desk to pay, he finds a long line of schoolchildren there.
If he waits for all of them to finish, he will miss the
minyan. May he go to the head of the queue, or will
he be stealing their time by so doing, rendering his
subsequent tefilloh an abomination?
6. Is a store owner allowed to attend first to the
purchases of a wealthy and valuable client, and leave those
in front of him in line, to wait?
One general point needs to be made before discussing the
issues which these questions involve. If one of the
conditions of a doctor's employment is that he treats
patients in the order of their registration or arrival, he
may certainly not make any changes, for this would be
breaking the agreement which his employer made with him.
This can be assumed to be a condition of employment in the
case of government-funded hospitals, or any government
office that deals with the public.
In the case of Kupat Cholim (HMOs -- health organizations
whose services are partly paid for by patients' dues),
tampering with the queue also involves depriving patients of
privileges which they have paid for. The first two questions
are therefore only relevant in the context of a private
medical clinic. Similarly, the third question would also
only be relevant in the case of a gemach. May a later
applicant be placed before an earlier one?
In Beis Din and at the Doctor's Office
We find the following halochoh in Choshen Mishpot,
siman 15:1- 2: "A dayan must give precedence to
judging the case that came before him first, however, he
must give precedence to the case of a talmid chochom,
even if he came at the end . . . If there are many cases
before him, the case of an orphan is given precedence over
the case of a widow and the case of a widow over the case of
a talmid chochom. The case of a talmid chochom
comes before the case of an am ho'oretz (see Shach
se'if koton 3: `. . . there are grounds for each of
them to be first, therefore those grounds which involve
Torah's honor are preferred. In addition, we wish to
minimize bitul Torah (and the Rambam writes
(Horiyos) that the reason is that the talmid
chochom benefits the nation immensely) and the case of a
woman comes before the case of a man."
Is this order of preference only applicable to
dayonim, or will it be the same where the parties are
waiting in line to visit the doctor? A related question was
posed by the Aderes zt'l (who was rov of
Yerushalayim), who writes, "While I was in Dublin, I went to
consult a doctor. As I was preparing to go inside the
doctor's room, a woman suddenly entered the passage and
claimed that she had already waited there, and had just gone
out for a moment. I did not know that she had already been
there and I decided that in any case, I took precedence,
because `the command of honoring Torah is certainly
preferable.' One would have to reflect however, whether this
would also apply in the case of a widow. I was in doubt
about a case where the second arrival is more sick than the
first, whether he would take precedence, or whether we would
still say first-come-first- served" (From a manuscript
stored in Ponevezh Yeshiva).
Understanding the Issues
Two questions are thus posed by the Aderes: First, does a
widow go before a talmid chochom while waiting for
the doctor? And second, does a sicker patient go before a
healthier one, even though the latter arrived first? The two
ways of looking at the first question can be explained as
follows:
The reason that the case of a widow or an orphan is
generally heard first may be that beis din has a
general responsibility to protect their monetary interests --
"Judge [on behalf of] the orphan, take issue [on behalf of]
the widow" (Yeshayoh 1:17). Having their dispute
heard first acts as a counterbalance to any handicap in
arguing their case properly that may result from their
personal sorrows. According to this, the Chochmas
Shlomo argues that the halochoh would only apply
where the widow or orphan is the plaintiff, not where they
are the defendant.
In a similar vein, the Oruch Hashulchon (se'if koton
2), deduces that this halochoh would not apply if
the orphan's interests are being supervised by a guardian
who appears in beis din on his behalf. The Pischei
Teshuvoh also brings an opinion that holds this way. By
the same token, there would be no reason to let a widow or
an orphan go first in line while waiting for the doctor.
According to the understanding of the author of sefer
Haflo'oh (in his chiddushim to Choshen Mishpot
(siman 15) however, a widow may come before a talmid
chochom even in the line to see a doctor. The Haflo'oh
asserts that a talmid chochom takes precedence over
an orphan but not over a widow. Although this sounds strange
(because the orphan himself goes before a widow, who goes
before a talmid chochom), the Haflo'oh explains as
follows: The reason that an orphan takes precedence over a
widow is not because his distress is greater than hers. It
is because the beis din act on behalf of all orphans
and they have a responsibility to actively seek their
benefit. This obligation is the beis din's alone; it
is not binding on the talmid chochom, who therefore
takes precedence because of Torah's honor.
The reason that the widow goes first however, is because of
her grief, and the obligation to compensate for this by
letting her go first applies to the talmid chochom in
the same way that it applies to the dayonim.
According to this, a talmid chochom may have to let a
widow go before him in line to see the doctor as well,
because of her crushed spirit. The doubt expressed by the
Aderes may be over which of these possibilities is
correct.
Finding the Best Arrangement
The questions posed by the Aderes can apparently be resolved
through a passage in the Meiri's commentary to Sanhedrin
(32). The Meiri writes, "There are certain situations
which are not governed by [a fixed set of] obligations, but
in which one must pursue the most correct course and compel
one of the parties to act in a way in which he is not
[expressly] obliged, in the interests of reaching the best
possible compromise.
"This is what Chazal referred to when they said, "One
posuk says, " . . . Betzedek tishpot amisecho,
(Judge your comrade favorably)" (Vayikro 19:15), while
another posuk says, "Tzedek tzedek tirdof . .
. (Pursue the most just path)" (Devorim 16:20). Here (i.e.
the first posuk), it refers to the actual law, and
here it refers to compromise.
"How so? Two boats pass along a river and they meet. If they
both [try to] go at the same time, they will sink [because
the river is not wide enough]. However, if one goes after
the other [waiting to the side until the first one goes],
they can both pass. Similarly, two camels that were going up
ma'alos Beis Choron [a narrow mountain trail] and met
each other. If they both [try to] go [together], they will
fall down. If one goes after the other, they can both go
up.
"What do we do? If one of them is laden and the other is
not, the one that is not should give way to the one that is.
If one of them is near the city and the other is far, the
one that is near should give way to the one that is far. If
they are both near, or both far, or both laden, or both not
laden, they should come to some compromise [about which will
stand aside for the other] and [the] one [that will be going
first] should pay something to the other one.
"It is the same in any such situation. Whichever party we
see is better able to endure the delay, should give way to
the other side. Thus, a healthy person should give way to a
sick person, and the like.
"And they also said this regarding hearing cases in beis
din. If there are many disputants before a dayan,
an orphan comes before a widow, a widow comes before a
talmid chochom, a talmid chochom before an
am ho'oretz and a woman before a man, because her
embarrasment is greater. If all of them were equal, whoever
arrived first, is heard first."
Who Gives Way?
The Aderes' questions can be resolved in the light of the
Meiri's comments. First, whoever is least able to endure the
wait, goes first, the source in the Chumash for
which, according to the Meiri, is the posuk "Pursue
the most just path . . . " A gemora in Megilloh
(29) lends support for the Meiri's application of this
posuk. The gemora tells us that, "[The two
amoro'im] the fathers of Shmuel and Levi, were
sitting in the beis haknesses of [the town named]
Shof Veyosiv. The Shechinoh came and they
heard a sound. They got up and left. Rav Sheshes, who was
blind, did not leave. The mal'ochim came and scared
him so that he would leave.
He said to Him, "Ribbono Shel Olom, if one is
wretched and the other is not, who should be pushed aside
for whom?"
Hakodosh Boruch Hu said to the mal'ochim,
"Leave him alone."
See also the sefer, Kesef Hakodoshim (Choshen Mishpot,
siman 66), who writes that a dayan should give
precedence to a case involving the restoration of domestic
harmony over a monetary dispute. He cites Moshe Rabbenu's
instructions to the tribes of Gad and Reuvein as an allusion
to this point: "Build yourselves cities for your children
and [only afterwards] enclosures for your flocks"
(Bamidbor 32:24). The distress endured by an absence
of domestic harmony is greater than that caused by monetary
disputes.
From the Meiri we also see that a widow comes before a
talmid chochom in other situations apart from beis
din, this being part of the principle derived from the
posuk, "Pursue the most just path . . . " Although
the order of precedence in beis din is a proper
obligation upon the dayonim, apparently not merely
because it is the best compromise, and one could therefore
ask how other situations can be derived from it, it seems
that the Meiri understood that the reason for an orphan or a
widow's precedence in beis din is their fragile
emotional state, making it incumbent upon beis din to
support them. This logic can then be extended to all other
situations, in which an orphan or a widow should be helped
and supported by going first.
End of Part I
