Part II
Introduction
There are many areas of life where waiting in line is
unavoidable. When there are a number of applicants for
treatment, for services or for assistance, they are
usually attended to on a first-come-first-served basis.
This article deals with whether and under what
circumstances, it may be justified to put a later
arrival ahead of others in line. In the course of the
discussion, the halachic basis for the whole idea of
waiting in line is examined.
First, some common questions relating to queue
jumping.
1. May one accede to the request of a sick patient,
whose condition is not dangerous, to put him ahead of
other patients who are waiting in line?
2. May one move a patient to the front of a queue of
people who are waiting for minor surgery, e.g. hernia or
eye operations, when it is certain that the postponement
will not cause any danger to the others?
3. Reuven tenders a request for government
assistance, or for a loan from a gemach, and is
told that he must wait on line. Since he is friendly
with the clerk or the gabbai who processes the
applications, Reuven asks his friend to put him at the
front of the line. May his friend grant this request,
even though it will certainly mean further delay for
others in having their needs met?
4. Reuven just needs to buy a stamp from the teller
at the post office, while all those in front of him in
line have lengthier business to conduct. May the teller
accede to Reuven's request to sell him his stamp
first?
5. Reuven is hurrying to shacharis, but he
must first bring home some groceries. When he comes to
the cash desk to pay, he finds a long line of school
children there. If he waits for all of them to finish,
he will miss the minyan. May he go to the head of
the queue, or will he be stealing their time by so
doing, rendering his subsequent tefilloh an
abomination?
6. Is a store owner allowed to attend first to the
purchases of a wealthy and valuable client, and leave
those in front of him in line, to wait?
The first part explained that if taking clients in
order is part of the job description then the worker has
no right to change the order. This generally applies to
large organizations.
The Meiri on Sanhedrin writes: "There are certain
situations which are not governed by [a fixed set of]
obligations, but in which one must pursue the most
correct course and compel one of the parties to act in a
way in which he is not [expressly] obliged, in the
interests of reaching the best possible compromise. This
is what Chazal referred to when they said, "One
posuk says, " . . . Betzedek tishpot
amisecho, (Judge your comrade favorably)" (Vayikra
19:15), while another posuk says, "Tzedek
tzedek tirdof . . . (Pursue the most just path)"
(Devorim 16:20). Here (i.e. the first posuk),
it refers to the actual law, and here it refers to
compromise.
The Basis for Queuing
An important principle is contained in the Meiri's
explanation: The basic premise of queuing, the rule that
"First come, first served," does not have the standing
of a fixed halochoh. Rather, it is a compromise,
which the posuk, "Tzedek tzedek tirdof . . . "
enjoins us to implement. The first in line goes first,
in the same way that a laden boat goes before the empty
one. This is, to quote the Meiri, "the most correct
course," yet it is "not governed by [a fixed set of]
obligations."
The great mussar teacher, HaRav Itzele Blazer
zt'l, author of Kochevei Or is also
apparently of the opinion that a queue is simply a
customary arrangement that has been adopted. On page 72,
he writes, in explanation of Chazal's statement that all
the world's inhabitants pass before Hakodosh Boruch
Hu on Rosh Hashonoh like bnei moron (sheep,
according to one of the gemora's explanations)
that they referred to, "the custom in a place where
great crowds gather, such as the yard before the travel
house, where many people come to request travel slips,
and each of them wants to hurry and conduct his business
first. It has been made a rule and a fixed custom that
whoever arrived first, attends to his business first.
Therefore, in order to preserve the order, all those who
come stand in a line, one behind the other, so that the
first to come will merit being attended to first. So it
is on Rosh Hashonoh: whoever merits passing first is
successful."
According to HaRav Blazer, the queue is therefore "a
rule and a fixed custom," which should be honored
because of the command to, "Pursue the most just path .
. ."
Another source where queuing is mentioned, is the letter
of the Roman Consul who witnessed the offering of the
korbon Pesach in Yerushalayim. The letter is
quoted in Shevet Yehudah and in the siddur,
Beis Yaakov. The Consul wrote, "When the tenth day
(of Nisan) arrives, everybody goes out to buy the
sacrifice which they know as Pesach. It is one of the
Jews' rules that when they go out for this service, no
one says to his friend, `Move aside!' or `Let me pass,'
even if the later one was Solomon or David, their kings.
I asked the priests, is this not a breach of etiquette?
(i.e. to let the king or more senior in rank stand in
line, without putting him ahead of others) and they
replied that this was in order to show that there was no
distinction before G-d during the preparation of His
service, and how much more so during His actual service.
At those times, they are all equal."
Chazal also instituted an order in the distribution of
pei'oh to the poor. The Rambam (in Hilchos
Matnos Aniyim 2:17), writes that, "pei'oh is
distributed to the poor at three times of day, in the
early morning, at midday and in late afternoon. If a
poor man comes outside of these [fixed] times, he is not
allowed to take, so that there should be a fixed time
when all the poor gather to take. Why didn't they fix a
single time of day? Because there are poor nursing
mothers who need to eat at the beginning of the day;
there are poor children who are not awake in the morning
and who will not get there before the middle of the day
and there are the elderly, who do not get there until
minchoh time."
This halochoh too, may have been prompted by the
mitzvoh of tzedek tzedek tirdof and concern for
the weak and wretched.
A Dual Obligation
In the light of the Meiri's comments, it seems that the
dayonim have to put an orphan or widow first for
two reasons: First, it is their special obligation as
dayonim who are commanded to, "Judge [on behalf
of] the orphan, take issue [on behalf of] the widow."
They must make it clear that they are the "father of
orphans" and the "defender of widows."
Second, they are included in the general rule to put
them first because of tzedek tzedek tirdof. The
reason for stressing that two separate principles are in
operation here is that there can be cases where only one
of them applies. For example, if a group of Jews appears
in a gentile court (under circumstances where they would
be permitted to do so), they would be obliged to let an
orphan or widow go first. Even though the gentile judges
would not be bound by the first reason, the disputants
themselves would be bound by the second.
In a Jewish beis din too, if a dayan did
not let a widow or orphan go first, according to the
second reason, they would be allowed to claim
restitution for their mistreatment, because their right
to be heard first due to tzedek tzedek tirdof had
not been honored. With regard to the first reason
however, it may be that an orphan has no claim against a
dayan for ignoring what is a moral injunction to
dayonim to put certain classes of disputants
first, rather than a definite right of those classes to
be given precedence.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, we return to the questions that
were raised at the beginning of the article:
Questions 1. and 2. This would only be allowed if the
patient asking to be put in front was less able than
those ahead of him to wait for his turn, either because
of his medical condition, or because of some other
pressing circumstance. In such a case, he would have a
clear right to go first.
3. The gabbai has no right to help Reuven as a
favor to a friend. Only a more urgent situation than
others would give Reuven (or anyone else in the line)
the right to be put ahead.
4. Again, unless Reuven cannot wait, for whatever
reason, the mere fact that his business will be quicker
than that of the people ahead of him apparently does not
entitle the clerk to attend to him first. However, it is
very likely that those ahead of him would forgo their
right to be before him if he asks them to.
5. It would seem that in this case, Reuven's hurry is
certainly greater than that of the children ahead of him
and he may therefore ask the storekeeper to attend to
him first.
6. The storekeeper may certainly not see to a valuable
customer who is behind others in the line.
`Would You Please Hold My Place In Line . . .
?'
Q. In Eretz Yisroel, it is common practice for
the latest arrival at the end of a queue to notify the
person in front of him that he has taken the next place,
then to leave and attend to other business, returning
(hopefully) just in time to take his place at the front
of the queue. While he is gone, others arrive and join
the queue. They judge how long they will have to wait
from the number of people they can see in front of them.
Understandably, they are upset and resentful when Mr.
Resourceful walks in and goes straight to the front,
causing them extra and unexpected delay. Is this sort of
"place grabbing" correct?
A. The fairest way of arranging things is to
attach a piece of paper to the wall where each person
notes his arrival, thus enabling everyone to know how
many people are in line before them.
If this is not done, the newcomer to the queue should
ask the person in front to inform all later arrivals
that he has a place in the line. Then he can go and come
back in time. It is small-minded and unfair of those who
are waiting to argue that they, who have been there all
the while, should not have to let him go straight to the
head of the queue. What will they gain by his sitting by
idly? Will they have any less time to wait? The
gemora (Bovo Kamo 20), teaches us that if Reuven
derives benefit from Shimon's property, while causing no
loss whatsoever to Shimon, Reuven owes Shimon nothing.
(In our case of course, Reuven's benefit is not even
derived from Shimon.)
Also of relevance is the rule that, "We enforce people
to relinquish middas Sodom (i.e. miserly refusal
to convenience another party)" (Bovo Basra 13).
Why not show goodwill towards a fellow Jew and, when all
have been informed that he has a place in the line,
allow him to utilize his time to the utmost, instead of
sitting and waiting? (This ruling is also cited in
Hizoharu Bemomon Chaveireichem, pg.155.)
If a long wait in line causes a patient weakness or
excessive suffering, it is correct to let him go first,
as the Meiri writes in Sanhedrin (32),
"Whoever we see can better endure the wait, should give
way to another [who can endure less], and similarly with
a sick person and a healthy person, and the like."
However, if one person has pressure of time because, for
example, he has to open a work place or collect young
children, and it is hard to determine whether he, or the
sick person is less able to wait, then whoever arrived
first should go first.
HaRav Yechezkel Sarna zt'l, related, "I used to
visit a certain doctor, one of the precious citizens of
Yerushalayim who, when he saw me waiting for him, would
bring me in without waiting in line. Once there was a
woman waiting for him and he departed from his usual
practice and took her in first. When she came out and I
entered, the doctor apologized and said, "That woman is
a widow and I don't take any payment from her. If I
would have seen you first, she would have thought that I
was putting you ahead of her because of the money, and
she would have felt that because I don't take money from
her, I don't treat her properly . . ."
