Only one thing concerned the negotiating team of UTJ: to
guarantee that the yeshivos hakedoshos would not be
undermined in any way whatsoever, for that was the mission
they had been charged to fulfill by the gedolei ume'orei
hador. After the intervention of the Supreme Court in the
issue of the arrangements of military deferrals of yeshiva
students, and after Barak himself proposed, in the previous
Knesset, a law undermining the status of the bnei
yeshiva, it seemed as if there was no natural way to
arrest the decree. The fact that the election campaign of the
Leftist party focused mainly on incitement and on attacks
against the yeshiva world only increased the fears. But with
chasdei Shomayim, their plots did not materialize. The
coalition agreement, which UTJ signed last week with One
Israel, leaves the chareidi representatives with their full
ideological demands intact.
Everyone thought that it was a political ploy. Could it be?
Would UTJ, a party with five Knesset representatives, really
support the Prime Minister elect without receiving even one
prestigious ministerial position? By way of comparison,
Mafdal also has five representatives and its coalition basket
includes the Housing Ministry, a deputy Education Minister,
and either deputy Religious Affairs Minster or some sort of
control of that ministry.
Indeed, from a simple political point of view, UTJ's joining
the coalition in support of Barak without any political
remuneration is an enigma.
In order to understand the background and the chain of events
leading to the signing of the agreement, in which for the
first time the status of the bnei yeshiva will be
clearly anchored in the law, we must go back in time.
Chareidim As an Alternative to the Arabs
In the previous Knesset, Ehud Barak, then the leader of the
main opposition party, proposed a law in the Knesset for the
conscription of yeshiva students into the army, and for a
halting of Toraso umanuso arrangement.
Barak's proposal, which was presented to the Knesset's
chairman, demanded that the number of yeshiva students
receiving exemptions be restricted. Every year the Vaad
Hayeshivos would present the IDF with a list of 700 bnei
yeshiva to whom the definition Torasam umanusom
would apply. The rest would go straight into the army.
The proposal to draft the yeshiva students presented by the
leader of the Labor party changed Israel's political map.
Throughout all the years of the State, the Labor party sought
to avoid a head-on confrontation with the chareidi public on
this issue. It always hoped to receive chareidi political
support.
The leaders of the Labor party adopted various slogans (by
and large empty) regarding their obligations to attend to the
needs of the chareidim, the preservation of the status quo,
etc. They used to don yarmulkes and visit rabbonim and
admorim prior to each election campaign. Barak changed
political history with one fell swoop.
The proposal to draft yeshiva students apparently meant that
Labor had decided to forego in advance any chareidi votes and
all future collaboration with chareidi representatives in the
Knesset.
Political commentators noted that Netanyahu, against the
background of serious terrorist attacks, aroused public fury
against the terrorists and against the Arabs in general. The
Labor party sought to substitute the chareidim for the Arabs
in Netanyahu's formula.
In the past, it was proved that incitement and provocation
win in the elections. Labor sought to ride on this winning
horse.
The Supreme Court Determines a Precedent
Barak's main purpose was to overturn Netanyahu's Jewish
majority, and to win at least close to half of it -- which he
ultimately did. Barak's advisors presumed correctly that if
he succeeded in this, he could win the elections with the
help of the Arabs. In order to win Jewish support, Labor's
advisors figured that the best point about which to beat on
the chareidim -- one which would create a consensus in favor
of Barak -- was the issue of drafting yeshiva students.
At about the same time that Barak made this proposal in the
Knesset, yet another appeal was made to the Supreme Court.
This appeal seemed at first to be just another in a long
series of appeals with the Supreme Court on that issue. Until
then, the Supreme Court had rejected all the appeals, and
claimed that the considerations of the Security Minister had
to be accepted regarding the granting of deferrals to various
sectors in Israeli society, among them yeshiva students, as
well as additional sectors such as athletes, musicians and
those who refuse to serve for reasons of conscience.
However, this time, the appellants claimed that the
considerations of the Security Minister regarding the
drafting of yeshiva students were mistaken, due to the large
numbers of deferred yeshiva students. In the appeal, the
petitioners asked that the number of yeshiva students
eligible for deferral be limited, and that the Supreme Court
itself determine that quota if the Security Minister dodges
that so-called obligation.
Unlike in the past, this time all of the permanent justices
of the Supreme Court (11 members) sat together in a special
formation which deliberated on the issue. To all it was clear
that the judges would relate to the appeal differently than
they had in the past.
The Supreme Court behaved as predicted and, for the first
time in the State's history, a most dangerous precedent for
the chareidi sector was set. The decision stated that the
Security Minister has no authority to determine the draft
deferrals of yeshiva students. The Supreme Court then
commissioned the Knesset to pass a law within a year which
would regulate the issue in a legal manner.
In its decision, the Supreme Court did not relate to the
deferrals of the army service of athletes, or of those who
refuse to serve for reasons of conscience, but only to the
deferrals of yeshiva students. "This decision stems from the
particular world view of the judges," UTJ claimed at the
time. However, the court's decision could not be reversed,
and the issue reached the Knesset.
The issue of drafting yeshiva students quickly became a
hostage of the Leftists in their campaign against Netanyahu.
To all it was clear that UTJ's passive policy of many years
of shev ve'al taaseh, which until then been the
preferable one, was no longer sufficient. An active policy
was necessary to pass a law to enable the Security Minister
to continue to grant yeshiva students who were still
studying, deferrals.
UTJ found it difficult to recruit a majority for such a law
in Netanyahu's government. The cracks in the coalition were
large and serious, and seven-and-a-half months, which
included the six months of the long election campaign, passed
in which they were unable to pass the law.
Merely a Hearing
Throughout the entire election campaign, Barak continued to
brandish his "Draft the Yeshiva Students" slogan and it was
clear to all that Barak would find it difficult to retreat on
this issue. The results of the elections underscored Barak's
intention, and at the victory rally in front of Tel Aviv's
city hall, posters and slogans were waved, celebrating the up-
and-coming secular government, and reiterating the election
platforms of "conscription of the yeshiva students," "a
chareidi-free government," and "converting Shabbos to
chol," Rachmono litzlan .
The media was euphoric, and no one believed that at the end
of the process, 40% of the members of Barak's coalition would
be shomrei mitzvot.
The events which led to this situation began in the Dan
Acadia hotel in Hertzelia. A number of days after the
elections, the five MKs of UTJ arrived at the hotel along
with the mayor of Bnei Brak, in order to open their first
round of negotiations with the One Israel team.
The representatives of UTJ felt that this meeting was just to
state and clarify their position. They made it immediately
clear that there were two main issues which concerned them:
the bnei yeshiva, and the Basic Laws for a proposed
constitution for the State of Israel. They requested that the
continuity of the studies of bnei yeshiva not be
undermined, and that their status be anchored in the law.
Regarding the Basic Laws, they sought to ensure that no laws
which are liable to injure the existing laws and religious
arrangements be passed.
The political commentators said that UTJ would not receive
what it wanted due to Barak's resolve regarding the drafting
of the bnei yeshiva, and that UTJ would have to remain
in the opposition. The members of UTJ's negotiating team felt
the same way.
Since then, 14-15 more meetings were held, among them 6
lengthy ones with Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
Yavneh and its Sages
Barak clearly understood that the issue of the bnei
yeshiva was the make-or-break issue for UTJ. UTJ's
negotiating team consulted maranan verabonon all
along, and they instructed it to demand clear legislation on
the issue in order to deny the Supreme Court any freedom of
maneuver on the issue of the deferrals.
One Israel at first refused to comply with UTJ's demand, and
tried to persuade the representatives of UTJ that in any
event the IDF doesn't plan to draft all of the yeshiva
students, but only those they think should be drafted.
Throughout the negotiations, the representatives of One
Israel tried to blur their meanings by means of high talk and
nice words about the need for conscription, albeit a small
amount, of bnei yeshivos, in order to supposedly
prevent polarization of the nation.
At certain stages of the negotiating, the representatives of
UTJ were convinced that their efforts were doomed to failure.
The gedolei haTorah listened to the misgivings of the
representatives, but instructed them not to yield, and to
continue to present the issue in a clear, final, and
consistent manner.
The resolute stance of UTJ, which it stressed the entire
time, that it is not interested in honors or positions but
only in "Yavneh and its sages," proved effective. Now, for
the first time since the establishment of the State the
status of the bnei yeshiva will be anchored in law and
it will no longer be possible to use the draft issue in order
to bash the chareidim.
The Second Section in the Agreement
One Israel sought to add an additional section to the
agreement, numbered 4B, to the effect that the IDF will
explore ways and conditions for the development of suitable
frameworks and courses for that part of the chareidi sector
which serves in the army.
One Israel was proud of this section, and noted that "the
bnei yeshiva will enter the employment circle in a
legal manner, without foregoing minimal military service."
Rabbi Gafni noted that UTJ asked not to include
paragraph 4B in the agreement, because it does not pertain to
UTJ, but rather to arrangements made by the army. "We asked
not to include the issue in the agreement, and in my opinion
those points do not pertain to our battle, which is
safeguarding of the status of the yeshiva students."
As proof, Rabbi Gafni noted that the head of the Draft Board
said in the past that 50% of the yeshiva students anyway end
up in various phases of army services. "That's not our
affair. We are concerned about the studies of the bnei
yeshiva. Young men who stop studying deal with the IDF on
their own about their new status. We haven't raised that
issue at all," he said.
The mayor of Bnei Brak, Rabbi Mordechai Karelitz, is also of
the same opinion. He said that section (4B) relates to the
frameworks for those who do not study in yeshiva, and that
UTJ has no part in this. "The IDF has always determined this
and will continue to do so now," he said.
Rabbi Karelitz noted that section 4B clearly states that it
is not referring to forced conscription, but rather to those
"who chose such conscription." Over these words there was a
very difficult struggle.
Rabbi Karelitz notes the importance of a law regulating the
status of the bnei yeshiva. "This issue always hung in
the air, but we didn't do anything about it. Our policy was
passive. Now a new situation has arisen, in which we have
been called upon to relate to the matter. The situation
remains status quo. But this time, it will be anchored in
legislation."
The Committee for Burying the Constitution
In addition to the issue of the bnei yeshiva, the
agreement contains a number of additional provisions to
safeguard the status quo on religious matters. For example,
it says that only the government will take legislative
initiatives on religious issues. This was put in to prevent
Meretz from making private legislative initiatives.
The issues of the Reform, the religious councils and
conversion matters were addressed only in the more general
paragraph on the status quo, and not separately. A practical
possibility of overcoming many of the problems is eliminating
the listing of nationality on identity cards.
UTJ's position with respect to the religious councils is that
everything possible must be done to prevent the inclusion of
the Reform in the councils. In the event that this is
impossible it is proposed to cancel the religious councils
and to incorporate them within the local municipalities.
The constitution issue wasn't mentioned in the agreement
between One Israel and UTJ. The overall agreement between
Barak and the other parties regarding the constitution
determines that a special committee will deliberate on the
issue in a forum which will prepare the constitution.
The committee was not given a time limit, although a number
of parties demanded that such a limit be imposed. As a
result, the constitution is liable to be held up for a very
long time, as is the case regarding many issues on which
committees which are charged with making decisions are not
given time limits.
The agreement also contains an allusion to the Bar Ilan Road,
in its reference to the lifestyle of the chareidi and
religious residents in areas where they constitute a
majority.
The part about the status of the chareidi education in the
overall educational system was designed to prevent people in
the Education Ministry under Meretz leader Yossi Sarid from
trying to make changes in the curricula, such as adding
citizenship classes.
An accompanying letter which Ehud Barak gave UTJ, states:
"The government which I head will respect the law and insure
the suitable and reasonable enforcement of all the
legislation on religious issues, as on other issues." The
meaning of this letter is that the existing religious laws
will be enforced, such as the Work and Rest Laws, and laws
pertaining to kashrus. UTJ sought, at the outset, to anchor
this obligation explicitly in the agreement, but Meretz
objected.
"Meretz has been very hypocritical on this issue. They are
the ones who champion the rule of law. But it has become
clear that their conviction pertains only to laws which apply
to them, and not to laws which are inconvenient for them,"
said Rabbi Moshe Gafni.
Rabbi Karelitz said that every part of the agreement
obligates all of the signers, including Meretz. "They didn't
want to sign the section regarding the upholding of the
religious laws, and claimed that it is actually status quo,
which they oppose. However, Barak announced that he would
direct the various ministries to enforce the laws."
The Status Quo Agreement
Rabbi Avrohom Ravitz said that is inconceivable that UTJ
should have to vote for all of the political issues which are
important to Meretz, while Meretz will refrain from voting on
issues which are important to UTJ. "Meretz must be obligated
to vote for the religious proposals, such as the bnei
yeshiva law, and we don't intend to have to recruit the
support of opposition by pleading with them to help us,"
Rabbi Ravitz said.
Rabbi Moshe Gafni calls the agreement with One Israel an
agreement for the preservation of the status quo, and says
that it is in no way a coalition agreement. Rabbi Gafni
notes, "It was clear that even without UTJ and even without
Shas, Barak could have established his government with the
Likud, especially in light of Sharon's wish to enter the
government at all costs."
A study of the political conduct of Barak reveals that at the
outset he sought to include UTJ in his government and to
secure its support and he also wanted Shas. However the Likud
served as an alternative, and Barak negotiated with them in
an intensive manner.
How can the collaboration of UTJ with a government in
which Meretz is seated be explained?
Rabbi Gafni: In accordance with the instructions of
the gedolei Yisroel, we are not partners with Meretz.
Therefore the agreement isn't a coalition one. It is a status
quo agreement. Unlike in the past, this time there was a need
for active legislation [about the bnei yeshiva], and
we couldn't suffice with passive behavior. For that reason we
signed the status quo agreement, at the instruction of
gedolei Yisroel.
What about positions?
Rabbi Gafni: "We are not accepting any positions, in
order not to be partners. We will support the government only
from the outside, in accordance with its behavior. Every day
it will be tested anew."
Rabbi Mordechai Karelitz, who conducted the negotiations,
summarizes and stresses: "We acted precisely as gedolei
Yisroel instructed us, by not taking part in a Leftist
government in which Meretz is a partner. We will test Barak
every single day, anew. We have certainly taught all a new
lesson in clean politics. The media is stunned, and doesn't
understand us."
