Part I
HaRav Meir Simchah Hacohen, the author of Or Somei'ach, bases a far-reaching reflection on the precise wording of a halocho in the Mishneh Torah. In the beginning of Hilchos Shevisas Ossor (1:2) the Rambam writes: "Every melochoh whose punishment is sekilloh when done deliberately on Shabbos, is punishable with koreis when done deliberately on the Tenth. Any act that obligates bringing a korbon chattos on Shabbos [i.e., when it is unintentionally done, whereas the same act when done deliberately is punishable with sekilloh] obligates bringing a korbon chattos on Yom HaKippurim."
The Rambam does not write "is punishable with koreis when done deliberately on Yom HaKippurim" but instead writes "on the Tenth," referring to the tenth of Tishrei, the day that Yom HaKippurim falls.
Why did the Rambam change the wording? Why did the Rambam not mention "Yom HaKippurim" in this case, as he did about the obligation to offer a korbon when an unintentional aveiroh is done?
The Rambam intends to teach us — writes the Or Somei'ach — that "willfully doing a melochoh shows one did not do teshuvoh, and Yom Kippur does not atone for him at all. For him this day was not Yom Kippur." For that sinner it was just a regular day that happened to be on the tenth of Tishrei, another day on the calendar. He uprooted the day's entire content and annulled the essence of Yom Kippur, a day devoted to teshuvoh, instead sinking deeply into sin.
Many years ago I heard a famous talmid chochom shlita emphasizing this thought. It is surely worthy of being analyzed and elaborated upon, but before we embark upon this study let us explain what Chazal (Yerushalmi Rosh Hashonoh 17a) write: that although "divrei Torah are poor in one place, they are rich in another." The simple explanation, and the popular one, is that although Chazal wrote briefly in one place about a certain topic they discussed it somewhere else at greater length.
There is, however, another more profound explanation: sometimes a person hears a bit of knowledge, some logic, a deep reflection, about a certain subject, and later, after much time has passed and when he happens to be somewhere else altogether, he hears some astute particular about another topic, and again at a different time and place he hears yet another point or insight. A person seriously interested in examining thoroughly what the Torah is teaching us will combine all that he has heard and create from it a splendid mosaic of fine intellectual concepts.
Ulla (Rosh Hashonoh 26a) remarks that we do not use a cow's horn for a shofar since a "prosecutor (the eigel - - golden calf) cannot become a defense counsel." For this same reason a Cohen Godol does not enter the Kodesh Hakodoshim on Yom Kippur wearing his golden clothing, since the eigel was made of gold. Instead he wears his white clothing when he walks into the Kodesh Kodoshim.
But why is only a shofar forbidden to be made out of gold? Do we not have the Aron, the Kapores, and the Keruvim — all of which were made of gold too? The gemora later asks this question, and answers, "Chotei bal yisno'eh ko'amrinan." We can use gold for a keli in the Beis Hamikdosh although it symbolizes the eigel hazohov, since using gold was never prohibited. What is forbidden is when there is a direct connection between the sinner and what he has sinned with. We cannot use a cow's horn that reminds us of the eigel because we adorn ourselves with its sound (Tosafos, s.v. chotei), nor can the Cohen Godol wear his golden clothing since he is enhancing himself with gold (Rashi, s.v. chotei), and gold was used for the eigel.
Adorning ourselves with these items, once used for sin, shows a connection between ourselves and the sin itself. This halocho emphasizes that neither the cow's horn nor the gold are the "prosecutors." Those objects did not sin, but rather a person's use of them for sin is the "prosecutor." Man alone has sinned.
What we have learned pertains to many other matters too. It is directly associated with the message the Mesillas Yeshorim (chap. 1) expands upon: that each spiritual concern, every lofty concept, will yield results depending purely upon how man approaches it. According to the way a person prepares himself for Yom Kippur: teshuvoh, improving his bad character traits, tefilloh, ma'asim tovim, and tzedokoh — that is the way it will be for him, as we see from the Or Somei'ach's explanation of the halocho in the Mishneh Torah. Likewise, Rosh Hashonoh is dependent upon how ready a person is for it.
The Shloh HaKodosh (Rosh Hashonoh, Ner Mitzvah) cites the gemora (Kerisos 6) about eating simonim on the night of Rosh Hashonoh, such as an esrog, koro, rubya, and karti. Rubya alludes to our zechuyos increasing (yirbu) and karti alludes to our enemies being destroyed (yikarsu). The Shloh asks how we know that we can interpret the simonim in such a way. Perhaps just the opposite can be understood: rubya that the zechuyos of other nations will increase, and karti that, choliloh, we will be destroyed.
The truth is, answers the Shloh, the simonim do not have any absolute reference. Their entire purpose is to awaken us to teshuvoh. When a Jew sees the karti and the rubya it stimulates him to pray that Hashem should destroy our enemies and that our zechuyos should increase. The simonim in and of themselves mean nothing at all, and everything is dependent upon man himself. (The Shloh refers to the Teshuvas Hageonim cited in the Mordechai at the beginning of Yoma, and also the Agudah and other opinions cited in the Beis Yosef — chap. 583 — although in the Mordechai there seems to be a different explanation.)
I believe we can add on to the Shloh's explanation. When a Jew sees karti on his table he can interpret it in either a beneficial or a harmful way. This is actually our own situation on Rosh Hashonoh: even it can be interpreted in the same two ways. Through our tefillos we can, due to Hashem's abundant chesed, tip the scales to destroy our enemies and increase our zechuyos. This is what is meant by the simonim on the night of Rosh Hashonoh — it is a siman for man himself.
End of Part I
