Almost all of 2005 was within the period of tahdia
(declared calm) that began on January 22 of that year,
but nonetheless there were 2,990 terrorist attacks against
Israeli targets. The firing of Kassam rockets even increased
a bit in 2005 compared to 2004, with 377 rocket attacks as
opposed to 309. Nonetheless, in the all-important human
casualty figures there were significant declines: Forty-five
Israelis (37 civilians and eight members of the security
forces, Hy"d) were killed in 2005, compared to 117 (76
civilians and 41 members of the security forces, Hy"d)
in 2004. Twenty-three of these were murdered in seven suicide
attacks (55 in 15 suicide attacks in 2004).
There was also a decline in the number wounded in 2005: 406
(302 civilians and 104 members of the security forces), as
opposed to 589 (394 civilians and 195 members of the security
forces) in 2004.
However it is clear that this decline was more the result of
Israeli security forces success, with siyata deShmaya,
than Palestinian restraint. The ISA arrested 160 potential
suicide terrorists in Judea and Samaria in 2005. If, chas
vesholom, a significant number of these attacks had been
carried out, there would have been no decline.
The number and level of warnings in 2005 makes it even more
evident that the terrorist organizations' attempts to attack
Israeli targets did not lessen. The number of monthly
warnings remained for the most part fairly high. In 2005
there were a total of 578 warnings with the average number of
monthly warnings at 48, and just about the same number at the
end as at the beginning: 61 in January 2005 and 57 in
December 2005.
The tahdia that was announced by the Palestinian
terrorist groups was an agreement among themselves and with
the Palestinian Authority. It did not involve Israel. It was
executed with the PA after the leadership changed from Yasser
Arafat to Mahmoud Abbas with the former's death. Abbas was
under strong international pressure to fight terrorism, and
that was the way he chose. He did not take away anyone's
weapons, and did not interfere with their operations in any
way.
Hamas announced that it accepted the agreement. The Islamic
Jihad announced that it did not. The Popular Resistance
Committees and Fatah's Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades announced an
end to their self-declared calm on midnight of December 31,
2005. Hamas made no public statement, presumably since it
plans to run in the PA elections scheduled for January 25 and
its embracing of terror and violence is an embarrassment to
those who support the elections.
However the breakdown of the terrorists arrested by the
organizations that sent them shows a broad distribution:
Hamas - 29, Islamic Jihad - 59, Tanzim - 47, PFLP - 14, Other
- 11.
Hamas did maintain an outward appearance of abiding by the
tahdia — mainly by refraining from publicly
claiming responsibility for terror attacks in which it
participated. For example, Hamas was responsible for the
suicide bombing at the Beersheva bus station on August 28,
2005, and in September Hamas terrorists abducted and murdered
Jerusalem businessman Sasson Nuriel. Moreover, Hamas assisted
other terrorist groups in carrying out their attacks against
Israel. Hamas is due to participate in the upcoming PA
elections without having disarmed or renounced terrorism or
even having refrained from terror at all.
There were also more terror attacks in Judea during the
period, with 379 attacks as opposed to 288 attacks in the
same time frame the year before. A significant decline was
registered in the Gaza Strip, with 1,205 attacks after 22
January 2005, as opposed to 2,637 before.
The terror organizations never renounced their public goal of
annihilating Israel and they certainly worked hard towards
that end by strengthening their capabilities. Because of the
publicly declared calm, because of the Disengagement from the
Gaza communities, and because of the hopes from Abbas, Israel
did not exert as much pressure on the terror organizations as
it did in the past. They took advantage of this to build for
future murders.
The terrorist organizations increased their efforts to
establish infrastructures for producing mortar rounds and
rockets in Judea and Samaria in order to move the main focus
of their efforts there after the Disengagement. In 2005,
eight such infrastructures (four of Hamas and four of the
Tanzim and Islamic Jihad) were uncovered.
The withdrawal of the IDF from the Philadelphi corridor in
September led to a significant increase in arms and
ammunition smuggled into the Gaza Strip. Over five tons of
explosives, approximately 200 antitank rocket launchers,
approximately 350 antitank rockets, approximately 5,000
automatic rifles, over one million rounds of ammunition and a
limited number of antiaircraft rockets were smuggled from
Egypt into the Gaza Strip. The peak smuggling was during the
week September 12-18,2005. In comparison, some 200 antitank
rocket launchers, 50 antitank rockets, 1,800 automatic rifles
and some ammunition were smuggled in during the first eight
months of 2005.
Members of the various Palestinian Authority (PA) security
services that are deployed along the border with Egypt do not
interfere with the smuggling. On the contrary. They play an
active role in bringing in the arms and ammunition, according
to the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
The four large-scale terrorist attacks inside Israel of 2005
were perpetrated by the operational infrastructures in
Samaria. In 2004 those infrastructures perpetrated two large-
scale terrorist attacks.
The terrorists exploit the weak points at the crossings of
the security barrier and also travel through Judea which
still lacks a complete barrier.
In the 34 months from the beginning of the intifadah in 2000
until the establishment of the security fence in July 2003,
there were 73 deadly suicide attacks and/or car bombs inside
Israel that originated in Samaria, in which 293 Israelis were
murdered and 1,950 were wounded. In contrast, in the 28
months from then to December 2005, there were 11 such attacks
inside Israel, in which 54 Israelis were murdered and 358
were wounded.
There was a dramatic increase in attempts to breach the
unfenced Sinai-Negev border area. This area is used by
smugglers, criminals and persons looking for work illegally
in Israel, as well as the terrorists. Frequently, there is
close cooperation between terrorists and criminal elements in
southern Israel. Israel recently made a major deployment of
elite troops to this area. The defense establishment prepared
an ambitious plan to erect a formidable security fence but at
an estimated cost of NIS 1.5 billion, it was put on the back
burner. The IDF is now seeking one-tenth of this amount.
Terror groups several times used Israeli-citizen drivers who
regularly smuggle Palestinian workers into Israel, to
transport bombers through checkpoints.
We can describe the past and plan for the future, but im
Hashem lo yishmor ir, shov shokad shomer (Tehillim
127:1).
