United Torah Jewry can certainly be pleased with its ability
to retain its position while slightly increasing its overall
number of votes. On the other hand, the party was not
particularly successful in repeating its performance of the
summer of 5759.
In the 5756 (1996) elections, UTJ received a total of 98,657
votes and then jumped 28 percent to 125,741 votes in 5759
(1999). In the recent elections UTJ received 135,087 votes--
an increase of only 7.5 percent. Yet in the final analysis
UTJ retained its five mandates, thanks primarily to the low
voter turnout among the general electorate which lowered the
number of votes per mandate even below that of the previous
elections.
Yet the party's improved achievements, both in terms of
increased votes and relative growth, fell far short of its
achievements in the previous elections in 5759. Many
observers were surprised to find the 7.5 percent increase did
not even reflect natural growth rates in the chareidi public,
estimated to be between 18 percent and 20 percent in total
during the almost four years. How could this be? Considering
the enthusiastic participation in chareidi areas, where did
all our votes disappear to?
*
United Torah Jewry has two main constituencies: hard-core
chareidi supporters who identify completely with the party
and its platform and who bring in the lion's share of UTJ
votes, and other supporters from various locations around the
country. The latter sector is comprised of traditional and
non-chareidi religious voters, the vast majority of whom are
Sephardic Jews.
This sector is not considered natural UTJ supporters who can
be relied on to give the party their votes every time. Their
support can only be won through concerted efforts and
persuasion. This has been the case in every election
campaign, and particularly this one which was noted for
extreme apathy among voters.
Both Jerusalem and Bnei Brak showed impressive increases, in
some respects even more significant than in the previous
elections when these two leading UTJ cities brought an
average growth of 9.5 percent. This time Bnei Brak brought an
increase of 12.5 percent (3,528 additional votes) and
Jerusalem brought an increase of 9 percent (3,165 additional
votes). Meanwhile other chareidi population centers including
Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, Telz Stone, Rechasim and Elad
showed a total increase of 19 percent, compared to a 13
percent increase from 5756 to 5759. So why were the overall
results this time lower than in the previous elections?
To answer this question we must examine the figures in other
locations. Secular towns and cities that include chareidi
populations did not reveal uniform voting patterns. Fifteen
selected locations that fall under this category brought a
dramatic increase of 27 percent in the 5759 elections, double
the relative increase posted in entirely and predominantly
chareidi towns and cities. These impressive results followed
intensive campaigning among traditional Jews in those
areas.
In the recent elections, the growth in these areas came to a
more modest 18 percent. A careful examination of these
figures shows the leading three cities in this category--
Ashdod (which has the third-largest chareidi population in
the country), Petach Tikva and Beit Shemesh--showed a 50
percent increase, whereas in general the other cities in this
category showed slight declines. The gap is primarily due to
increased migration to these three cities combined with
drastic drops among general and traditional voters.
Yet the big story of the 5759 elections as well as the recent
elections took place in towns and cities around the country
with relatively small numbers of chareidi voters. In 5759
significant increases were apparent in almost every outlaying
town, except for a few places (e.g. Kiryat Gat, Akko) where
the number of votes dropped. From 5756 to 5759 the increase
in some non-chareidi areas was less than 10 percent (e.g.
Eilat, Ramat Gan), while in other similar areas the increase
was 20 percent to 30 percent (Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, Raanana,
the Haifa area, Nesher). In other places the increase was 50
percent and more (Gan Yavneh, Or Yehuda, Azor, Gedera, Kfar
Saba, Nahariya, Carmiel, Afula, Migdal HaEmek) and some towns
even posted 100 percent increases (Cholon, Bat Yam, Ramle,
Lod, Rishon Letzion, Pardes Chanah, Kiryat Shemoneh, Maaleh
Adumim). In Kiryat Malachi and Natzerat Illit the number of
UTJ supporters increased by 200 percent, and in Dimona,
Yehud, Maalot and Givat Ze'ev by 300 percent-400 percent!
All this took place in the previous elections. UTJ's total
votes in these cities jumped from 12,435 to 18,537--an
average increase of 50 percent. And this time?
This time around the party posted a decrease of nearly
50 percent in these locations. Essentially the dramatic
achievements of 5759 were erased from the charts, bringing
the party back to 5756 voter figures in these places.
The above findings lead to an obvious conclusion: While in
5759 the primary increase in votes was in non-chareidi areas,
in the recent elections the increase in chareidi areas was
offset by the sharp decrease in other areas. Had we managed
to at least retain the results achieved in 5759 in these
areas, in addition to the votes achieved this time in
chareidi areas, the party would have garnered over 6,000
additional votes, which would have won us a sixth mandate
(probably by taking away Shas' 11th mandate).
These lost votes are not acquired automatically like the
chareidi vote, but require concerted efforts in the election
bureaus and by campaign field workers. Print and broadcast
ads do not win over these voters, who needed to be pushed and
prodded right up to Election Day, as activists who garnered
these votes in previously elections attest. Apparently
financial constraints and the thrifty policy followed in the
recent election campaign did not allow for the type of door-
to-door campaigning that has proven itself at the polls,
which is a real shame.
In retrospect, based on the election results, had more money
been invested in fieldwork the expense would have justified
itself and been paid off through the funding provided each
term for every additional mandate.
