Opinion & Comment
All of Israel are Collectively Responsible
by L. Jungerman

A new page was opened in the life of the nation from the moment they accepted upon themselves the oath at Mt. Grizim and Mt. Eival, when they became collectively responsible for one another. From that day on, the people lost their individual identity or culpability. Rather, Jewry became a unit: we. All as one, all responsible and guarantors for one another that we all would, indeed, fulfill the entire Torah.

This state of responsibility, of being guarantors, has direct halachic repercussions. In the blessings over food, and all bircos hanehenin which are not obligatory, if I have already recited the blessings before partaking, or I have no plan to eat now, I cannot motzi the others of their obligation, since I am not obligated to say the brocho, nor must I see to it that they make the brocho in question. Let them not eat, and not make any brocho.

But with regard to blessings over mitzvos, I can motzi others. Even if I have already recited the blessing myself and thus myself already fulfilled my individual obligation (like with kiddush and havdoloh, for example) I can say the brocho again, for the sake of my fellow- man.

Why is this so? Because so long as someone is still obligated to perform that particular mitzva, it is as if I, too, am under an obligation for that selfsame mitzva! I must see to it that he fulfills his duty, and thus can also make the brocho.

There is a similar law regarding preventing another from committing a sin. In maseches Shabbos it is written that a person is permitted to transgress a light prohibition in order to save himself from a more stringent one. If one had inserted some dough into an oven where it will bake on Shabbos, for example, one should remove it as soon as possible -- despite the prohibition miderabbonon involved in removing dough from an oven on Shabbos. We say that he may commit the "light" transgression of removing dough from a hot oven, in order to save himself from transgressing the more serious Torah prohibition against baking on Shabbos which he would commit if he leaves the dough in the oven until it is baked. [The Torah prohibition against baking on Shabbos is violated by putting dough in the oven and leaving it there until it is baked.]

The gemora says that this only refers to an individual who can save himself. If another person (Y) inserted the dough into an oven on Shabbos, he (X) is forbidden to transgress the prohibition of the Sages and to remove it in order to avoid an issur mideOraisa on the part of Y. There is a rule that we do not tell one person to sin in order to bring benefit to another person (for example, to remain with a lesser sin).

Tosafos write there that this applies to one (Y) who put the dough in the oven intentionally, knowing that it is Shabbos and that doing so is prohibited. But if the other person (Y) did so not knowing that it was a sin -- for example he forgot that it was Shabbos when he put it in -- then the one (X) who sees him sinning is permitted to remove that dough, even though X is transgressing a miderabbonon, in order to save Y from violating a transgression from the Torah.

Why should it be permissible? Are we not held responsible for our own individual sins? How can we make such an offset of our sin against his? What does my sin have to do with his; and what do I have to do with him? What permits me to do this sin? Why should his serious sin affect me or obligate me to prevent him -- at my expense? Who allows me to transgress? Is it not forbidden?

The answer, note the commentators, is that the question is mistaken. If my fellow transgresses a law of the Torah, I also transgress it, for all of Israel are mutually responsible not to sin. Each one of us is obligated not to sin himself, and is also obligated to see to it that his fellow Jew also does not sin. We are one.

Therefore, if we are faced with a choice, one alternative of which involves a lighter transgression on my part and the other, a more stringent one because my fellow transgresses the more serious one -- then I, personally, must choose the lesser of these two transgressions which is my lighter one. This is on the condition, of course, that the violator is doing so unintentionally, in which case we are surely responsible for him. If, however, he is sinning knowingly and refuses to accept rebuke, we are not responsible for him (see Dogul Meirevovo, Yoreh Dei'oh 141).

The situation in which the entire nation is considered a single unit, and all collectively are responsible for one another, first applied when the nation entered Eretz Yisroel. "For Eretz Yisroel is special unto Jewry and it makes all of the Jews living in it as one man. This is why when they entered Eretz Yisroel, they became areivim" (Maharal). The aspect that transforms a nation of six hundred thousand separate units into one single bloc is the fact of their living in Eretz Yisroel.

The King of Kuzar asked the Jew: "Is it not true that in these times, in exile, you Jews are like a headless, heartless body?" And he replied, "Yes, that is true. Even more so: we are not even a body, but scattered bones, like those dry bones in the vision of the prophet Yechezkel" (Sefer Hakuzari: Maamar Sheini). Without Eretz Yisroel, the body of Jewry is dissembled and scattered; Eretz Yisroel transforms those who live in it into a corporate unit, like one man.

Here in Eretz Yisroel there are Kohanim at their divine service, Leviim at their holy song and Israel in their own place and station. Here the roles are divided among the respective people, and through our collective service we achieve a collective object, a unified goal. No single person can achieve everything; he is only required to play his role, and to be part of the whole unit. The collective goal is not achieved from individual roles separately, only from the joint effort of everyone, all together.

On Yom Kippur, when a Jew stands bowed before his Creator, he confesses his sins in the plural form: OshamNU, bogadNU. Rabbenu Chaim Vital zy'o explains (Likutei Torah: Parshas Kedoshim): "My master, the Arizal, was accustomed to recite the entire vidui, even those he did not have on his record. He used to say that even those sins that were not found in him [i.e. among his deeds], he was, nevertheless, obligated to confess. That is why this prayer was composed in the plural, writing for example "chotonu," and not "chotosi." Since all Yisroel is like one unit (guf echod), therefore, even though he personally did not commit a particular sin he must nonetheless confess it, since when his fellow committed it, it is as if he committed it, and that is why all expressions of commission are written in the plural. Even if one is praying alone, at home [where he cannot be referring to the tzibbur surrounding him], he must still say the prayer in the plural, for what even one Jew has sinned is reckoned as if all sinned together because of the unity of all souls (arvus neshomos)."

In the judgment that takes place on the Yomim Noraim, each individual is measured against this yardstick. "He creates together their hearts; He understands all of their deeds." He judges the position of the individual within the context of the community and his individual position in the collective as part of the "together." Hashem studies the condition of the single limb and how it operates in the context of the entire body. If the body has a blemish or fault, it is not enough that the fingers are in perfect condition.

And parallel to this, all of our prayer-entreaties are couched in the collective mode: ZochreiNU, kosveiNU -- Remember US, Write US, Forgive US, Open for US the gate . . . Bless US, Father, all of US, like one, together, with the light of Your countenance.

Like one man, with one heart. Literally.