Analysis
The day after, it was clear to all that more than Ehud Barak
had won the elections, Binyamin Netanyahu had lost them.
Binyamin Netanyahu brought this loss upon himself. One simply
can't fight for so long a time, with so many people in the
country and throughout the world. Netanyahu was scorned by
very broad circles and many people no longer believed a word
he said. All that they wanted was to see him lose and go
home.
Of course, there was an unprecedented, massive mobilization
of forces against Netanyahu. However, the results of the
elections clearly prove that Netanyahu's loss came from
inside: from his former supporters and voters -- from the
Likud, the Mafdal and the settlers.
For the past 20 years, the Left and the Right political blocs
were about even. This tie was not broken when Yitzchak Rabin
won the elections by a minimal number of votes, nor when
Binyamin Netanyahu triumphed over Shimon Peres by one half of
a percent. This time the gap between Netanyahu and Barak was
close to 8 per cent. Numerically speaking, the Left seems to
have won.
However, when one examines the results of the elections to
the Knesset, a totally different picture emerges. The Right
bloc, which includes the Likud, Shas, Mafdal, UTJ, Yisrael
Beiteinu and the Ichud Haleumi, has 53 mandates. Among the 7
mandates of Yisrael b'Aliya, at least half are also Right
voters, as in the One Nation party which received 2 mandates.
In other words, the Right has 57 Knesset seats, and perhaps
more, indicating that the gap between Netanyahu and Barak
should have been much smaller than it actually was.
The conclusion is obvious. Many voted for the Likud or the
Right for the Knesset while supporting Barak for prime
minister. The same holds true regarding the Mafdal, even
though the official party position was to support Netanyahu.
Even some voters for the Ichud Haleumi supported Barak, while
others did not cast a vote for prime minister. It also
appears that some UTJ and Shas supporters, mainly in the
peripheral communities, also voted for Barak.
A conspicuous example is the chairman of the Yesha Council,
Yisrael Har-el, a staunch supporter of the Ichud Haleumi.
Even before the elections he declared that he had no
intention of supporting Netanyahu, and last week clarified
that he meant what he had said. In the territories, Barak was
supported by 15% of the settlers. In Ramat Hagolan he
received more votes than Netanyahu. These are startling
statistics, in respect to the man whose polices the residents
say they fear.
Barak received an impressive amount of support in Efrat. This
settlement is comprised of a large percent of Meimad people,
who went hand in hand with Yisrael Achat. However, there are
also people there who supported the Ichud Haleumi and who
voted for Barak for prime minister. One of them is Dr.
Wexler, a staunch Rightist who was fed up with Netanyahu and
stressed that, in his opinion, it was time to get rid of this
undependable person.
A UTJ activist in Tel Aviv related that an elderly,
traditional woman told them that she would vote gimmel
for the Knesset and Barak for prime minister. Activists who
paid her a house call were told that she was supporting
gimmel in order to increase Yiddishkeit in the
State, and Barak because Netanyahu wasn't honest.
The ramification of all of these statistics is that the tie
between the Left and the Right blocs still exists in Israel.
Nothing has changed except for the fact that, in light of the
behavior of the outgoing Prime Minister, a certain sector of
the Right either crossed over to the other camp on a one-time
basis, or abstained from voting. Many said, "yes" to the
Right, and "no" to Netanyahu.
A Complicated Puzzle
Ehud Barak repeatedly declared that he intends to be
"everyone's prime minister," and hints that he plans to
establish the broadest possible coalition. In reality,
according to the results of the Knesset elections, forming a
government will be very complicated.
The Leftist bloc, including the two mandates of Amir Peretz,
has exactly 60 Knesset members. This includes: the Arab
parties and Achmed Tibi, with a total of 10 mandates; Yisrael
Achat, with 26; Meretz with 10; Shinui with 6; and the
Centrist party with 6. To these, one could add Yisrael
b'Aliya's 7 mandates, and form a coalition of 67 mandates,
including 19 Arab Knesset members. Such a government would be
far more Leftist than those of Rabin and Peres, and would
clearly depend on the Arab MKs.
An additional possibility for a broad government is one which
will include the Likud, Shas, Mafdal, and UTJ, in addition to
Yisrael Achat, Meretz, the Centrist party and Amir Peretz. In
line with its repeated declarations that it won't sit with
the chareidim, Shinui would not participate in such a
government. Although such a government can rest on 90 or more
MKs, the big question is whether such a configuration is
realistic.
Will the Likud opt to join the government or to rehabilitate
itself from the opposition? Will Shas want to sit with
Meretz, and Meretz with Shas? Can UTJ sit in a government
alongside Meretz? What about the Mafdal?
This and more. A coalition isn't only a connecting factor
between various parties and the Knesset members. A government
must be established according to foundation lines and on a
basis of joint activity. It's hard to see Uzi Landau sitting
with Yossi Beilin and Beilin with Ran Cohen. It's hard, too,
to see Limor Livnat, Naomi Blumenthal, Dani Naveh and others
sitting with Avraham Burg, Uzi Baram, and Yossi Sarid. On
what common lines will they agree? On a Palestinian
government? On a retreat from the Golan? On the freezing of
building in the settlements? On the freezing of building in
Har Choma?
There is also the possibility that Barak will opt to
establish a government without Meretz, something which will
make it easier for him to include the Likud and the religious
parties. But this possibility is very slim. Tremendous
pressure not to prefer the religious and the right over
Meretz, his natural partner, would be put on him from within
his own party as well as from the public at large.
Barak could also establish a narrow government, and include
the five Mafdal members, as Yitzchak Rabin did in 1992 with
Shas. However, such a plan is unlikely to transpire. Shaul
Yahalom, number two in the Mafdal and one of the moderates of
his party, has already announced that although the Mafdal is
prepared to enter a government with Barak, it has red lines.
One of those lines is the continuation of building in the
settlements and an obligation not to return settlements as
part of the permanent arrangement in the Middle East. It's
doubtful that Barak could or would provide this. And so, this
option must be crossed off the list.
On election eve, Meretz chairman Yossi Sarid vowed that his
party would not sit in a government with Shas, with or
without Deri. "Read my lips," he said in English, and
repeated this a number of times. This means that from his
point of view, the option of a government with Shas and
Meretz, as was the case in Rabin's time, does not exist. It
is, however, highly likely that if he's promised a
ministerial seat and a Volvo, he'll do hatoras nedorim
and explain that he was referring to a situation in which
Deri would represent Shas in coalition negotiations with
Barak. However, since Deri has now stepped aside, there's no
problem. But if Sarid is stubborn on that point, Barak will
be in a pickle.
In the end, Barak was elected Prime Minster with a very
impressive majority. However, his situation from the point of
view of the coalition puzzle is far from simple. Every script
is problematic. Whatever he does, he will meet up with
obstacles, sometimes from the Right, at other times from the
Left. The various combinations range from difficult to
impossible. Even Yisrael b'Aliya is problematical for Barak,
if we recall that both ministers of the party, Scharansky and
Edelstein, are staunch Rightists who voted against the Hevron
and Wye accords. Barak has a lot of work to do before
completing the puzzle.
