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IN-DEPTH FEATURES
Part I
The Conservative and Reform Number
Game
An Orthodox reader of contemporary Jewish demographic studies
better come equipped with a good sense of humor and a large
dollop of disbelief, otherwise; the somber reports about the
future of Orthodox Jewry are liable to send him off to his
local funeral home to order a set of shrouds while the supply
lasts.
Even though every year we know that we have to chase after
principals whose schools are overflowing to accept our
children, even though almost monthly we're informed of a new
housing project going up for another religious neighborhood
in Israel or in New York, and even though kosher food
services and Orthodox publishing houses have burgeoned beyond
belief in the past few years -- the demographic savants are
still predicting that we're on the way of the dinosaur.
How can the university statisticians and sociologists make
such a grave error when all one needs to disprove their
conclusions is to just walk through Williamsburg or Monsey,
Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Ashdod or Kiryat Sefer -- or dozens of
other such communities?
To a large degree, the experts were misled by the conclusions
of the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) carried out
by the Council of Jewish Federations (U.S.) in 1990, which
until today is the most authoritative source for statistics
about the American Jewish community. The study's findings
showed that while 11% of the respondents came from Orthodox
homes, only 7% are Orthodox today. The obvious conclusion:
the Orthodox are decreasing. For instance, in Jewish
Choices, published by the State University of New York in
1998, the distinguished authors (who include a professor
emeritus of Sociology at Bar Ilan University, professor of
sociology at Connecticut College, and professor of Sociology
at the University of Connecticut) conclude:
"The major problem for the Orthodox denomination is how to
stem its historically heavy losses to other denominations,
especially to the Conservative movement." (p. 133)
How are the savants so off-base in their analysis of the
situation?
We feel that their unfamiliarity with our communities is only
partly responsible for their inaccurate findings. The real
problems are rooted in the inadequacies of a population
survey in general, and with the NJPS in particular.
Inadequacies of Population Surveys
There are so many problems with surveys that it is possible
to produce findings widely divergent from the reality, even
with a serious sincere effort. These are some of the reasons
why:
1. Inaccurate representation
In contrast to a census in which every person is counted, a
survey only takes a small sampling and projects it onto the
whole.
When they started, those conducting the NJPS randomly phoned
some 125,813 randomly selected homes throughout the U.S.
Based on the responses of those who claimed they were Jewish
or "Jewishly affiliated," which totaled 5,146 households,
they re-contacted them and tried to ask them detailed
questions about themselves. The got a total of 2,441
completed interviews, which yielded information on 6,514
persons in those surveyed households. Based on these replies
and "using a process of scientific weighting procedures,
utilizing all 125,813 Stage I interviews," he concluded that
the sample represents 3.2 million American households
nationally. Using similar weighting procedures, they
determined that the total number of people represented was
8.1 million, including many not Jewish (as per the mixed
composition of many of the households). With this, they made
projections for the entire Jewish community.
We wonder -- how many of those targeted included religious
Jews in Williamsburg, Monsey, LA. or Baltimore? Maybe none?
Maybe they did target one Williamsburg Jew and when they
started asking him detailed questions about his convictions,
the man answered, "Iz doh a nudnik oif di telephone,"
and hung up?
Religious Jews have a tendency to be circumspect about giving
out private information which is well known to the poll-
takers in Israel. Moreover, religious Jews tend to be heavily
concentrated in certain geographical areas because of their
need to access shuls within walking distance on Shabbos, and
to maintain their day-to-day involvement in many community
institutions (shuls, yeshiva, chesed organizations,
youth groups).
2. Undefined categories
Those conducting the survey said quite clearly that they
asked for no supporting documentation or even provided no
standard definitions of the categories that they proposed.
Respondents were asked if they are: Orthodox, Conservative,
Reform or secular. But what do these categories mean? To a
secular Jew, his grandmother was Orthodox because she lit
candles Friday night and wouldn't eat pork, even though she
may have driven a car on Shabbos. A Reform Jew might call her
Conservative, and an Orthodox Jew might have termed her
Reform.
What is the difference theologically and practically between
one who defines himself as nondenominational, and one who
defines himself Reform?
When the categories are undefined, whatever findings one
obtains are unreliable. As they noted themselves in their
official summary of the NJPS: ". . . in the United States,
religion and ethnicity are voluntary expressions of identity.
. . . Consequently may people exhibit inconsistencies in
their behavior with respect to normative expectations."
3. The crucial beginning point
History is composed of shifting trends and patterns. Every
poll must have a starting point at which it quantifies what a
group was like then, and how it has developed since. The
starting point is crucial. Assume that the following
statistics on the percentage of Orthodox Jewry among total
Jewry are accurate. (They are not.):
Percent born Orthodox of total Jewish population in 1940 --
10%, currently Orthodox in 1999 -- 7%.
Percent born Orthodox of total Jewish population in 1960 --
2%, currently Orthodox in 1999 -- 7%.
The first statistic indicates that Orthodoxy is suffering
from a clear decline; the second, that it is experiencing
tremendous growth. The first Orthodox graduates who attended
twelve years of day school only appeared in the late 60's and
70's. To appreciate the present growth of the Orthodox
community, it is necessary to study those who were born in
the 1950's and who had the benefit of a full Jewish
education.
4. How the question is worded can radically change the
reply.
The NJPS asked respondents how many were born in Orthodox
homes, and how many were now Orthodox. The answer was -- 11%
were born in Orthodox homes and 7% are now Orthodox. But how
was Orthodox identity defined? If they had asked instead,
"Did you fully observe the laws of Shabbos and kashrus as you
were growing up, and do you now?" the percentage of those
stating that they grew up Orthodox might have declined
greatly. Instead of Orthodox decline, the statistics might
have shown Orthodox growth.
5. Statistics are easily manipulated, and drawing
projections from samples is often illusory.
Statistics are easily manipulated to deliver the conclusions
that one wants. Imagine a town where an old Eskimo lived
alone by himself. One year, an Eskimo family with four
members move in. One could then accurately report: "The
Eskimo community is one of the youngest sectors in town --
80% are age 30 and younger." or, "Unprecedented influx of
Eskimos -- 400% increase in Eskimo sector this year."
When the old Eskimo passes away, the headlines might report
"Flu decimates elderly Eskimo population."
This exaggerated example is actually used extensively by all
media manipulators. For instance, when a Tiveryan local
weekly placed a voting booth next to the home of Yitzchak
Mordechai's mother to see if people in this Likud stronghold
(who had voted exclusively for Netanyahu in the last
elections) would switch their vote to Mordechai, the results
were 22% for Mordechai and 78% for Netanyahu. The results in
that location, which could be expected to show the greatest
support for Mordechai because of neighborhood and familial
associations, actually demonstrated his resounding failure in
barely garnering a fifth of the vote. But Ha'aretz
turned it into a triumph for the left, since it
demonstrated "22% less support for Netanyahu." Since this was
on Mordechai's home turf, it would be deceptive to draw any
parallels for nationwide support for Mordechai or Netanyahu,
but Ha'aretz did not hesitate to make such a sweeping
conclusion based on these "real-time" statistics.
In fact, there are many who have reasons to inflate American
Jewish population statistics, ranging from Jewish social
workers who want to show that they have a large "client base"
to Reform leaders who want to "prove" that they have many
followers.
The NJPS and the Orthodox Jews
Having explained the fallacies inherent in surveys in
general, let's go back to the NJPS and show why its findings
do not accurately reflect the situation of Orthodox Jewry in
the U.S.
The majority of the millions of Jews who arrived in the U.S.
during the early decades of this century were Orthodox in the
sense that they upheld tradition, davened in Orthodox
shuls, kept Shabbos (even while many worked in their stores),
ate only matzos on Pesach, and wouldn't eat pork.
Their own motivation for keeping these mitzvos ranged from
truly religious to ethnic, but it is questionable if the vast
majority of their children could be considered Orthodox at
any point in their upbringing, in the sense that we today
call someone Orthodox.
Their children's Jewish education usually consisted of a few
hours a week after a long day at public school. The effect on
religious commitment was minimal or adverse. Whatever Jewish
tradition the children kept lasted only as long as they lived
at home. If they ever kept kashrus, it was only
because their mothers' cooking at home did not include pork
and mixed meat and dairy foods, and not because of any
conscious decision on their part to be observant.
The situation today is vastly different. No honest person
would claim that he is Orthodox unless he strictly keeps a
minimum of Shabbos and kashrus.
This situation of growing Jewish acculturation, and
secularization of the so-called Orthodox, ended at World War
II, which it is clear should always be seen as the turning
point in Orthodox life. Whereas Jewish immigrants before the
war came to seek a better material existence or a more secure
life for themselves, the end of World War II brought an
influx of strictly Orthodox refugees who fled the horrors of
Europe and sought to transplant their Jewish identities and
communities intact to the American scene.
Moreover, the groundwork laid by American Orthodox Jewish
leaders in the previous decades finally solidified and they
succeeded in establishing a new, previously unknown American
Orthodox lifestyle that preserved fidelity to Jewish law
while coalescing (each group to its own degree) with the
American scene. The necessary formula included the
establishment of day schools with a certain amount of secular
studies, seminaries where girls study Jewish education at an
advanced level, yeshiva attendance for all youths until
adulthood, professional training, and integrating with the
American work force. From then on, Orthodoxy began to rally
and experienced tremendous growth.
The NJPS actually hints to this new trend in its conclusions
concerning the retention power of the Orthodox. The younger
the age bracket, it says, the higher the Orthodox retention.
Thus, the study claims that in the 50-59 age bracket, the
retention rate among the Orthodox is only 11.7%, but among
the 18-29 year olds the retention rate is 65.2% (and even
higher if one includes ba'alei teshuvah and if one
considers that the rate of natural increase (children) of the
Orthodox is far above the average 1.6% Jewish rate).
If we accept as the criteria for an Orthodox Jew the strict
observance of Shabbos and kashrus, we might find
perhaps that a mere 2% of all Jews in the U.S. in 1950 were
truly Orthodox. In the 1990 NJPS, those who claimed to be
Orthodox today (and who presumably would claim that the above
two criteria apply to them), total 7% of all respondents.
This is an impressive 350% growth. In the absence of an
accurate survey I cannot prove this claim, but anyone who is
active in Orthodox life today would agree that it mirrors the
growth that we who are living in the community have witnessed
over the past few decades.
One way to describe the growth of the present Orthodox
community and separate it from the former pattern of
acculturation of the traditionally Orthodox that existed
before World War II, is to research the growth of the
Orthodox day school movement. A Jewish day school education
is perhaps the most tangible criteria of the new Orthodox
American community.
On a personal note, when the head of the local yeshiva
suggested to my shomer Shabbos father that he send his
children to learn in the local yeshiva in the early 1960's,
it was by no means the foregone conclusion that it is today.
Despite their commitment to observant Jewish life, parents
then had concerns of sectarianism and inferior education that
made them reluctant to send their children to a Jewish day
school. These concerns would not even occur to an Orthodox
parent today. Today, no Orthodox parent would seriously
consider sending his children to a public school if a day
school existed nearby, notwithstanding the high expenditure
it entails.
The NJPS and Reform Jews
Having explained why the NJPS cannot be relied upon to give
an accurate picture of Orthodox Jewry, we have to explain
equally why it cannot be relied upon to give an accurate
picture of the Reform and Conservative movements.
Imagine this situation: We meet a fellow in Spain and ask him
if he is an American. "Si, senor," he tells us. We ask
further, "Do you speak English?" He tells us that he doesn't
speak English. "Were you ever in the U.S.?" He says that he
made a 5-day vacation stopover ten years ago. "Did you ever
study U.S. history, art, politics?" No, nothing. Finally, we
ask him, "So what makes you an American?" He replies that he
feels an affinity to Americans, so that's why he answered
yes.
National or ethnic or religious identity is not merely
wishful thinking. It is a sum total of lifestyle, behavior
patterns, geographical location, language, history and
culture. Every religion has a set of beliefs, values,
practices and holidays which its adherents must believe in
and observe, and which distinguishes them from other
religious groups. Basic Christian beliefs and holidays are
universally known in the West where that is the dominant
religion, and can be viewed almost every time one steps in to
a department store during holiday seasons.
What constitutes the basic set of beliefs, values, practices
and holidays of the Reform and the Conservative movements?
The researcher quickly discovers that there are virtually no
universally accepted values and beliefs in these movements,
and that core beliefs are frequently put to the vote in a
meeting and changed with a wave of hands. It is true that age-
old Jewish holidays are celebrated -- but after undergoing
modern adaptation and extensive plastic surgery, which again
is subject to reinterpretation as new values are adopted from
the host gentile society. For example, up until 1983, the
Reform movement did not consider the offspring of a Jewish
father and a non-Jewish mother to be Jewish. Suddenly, after
a vote taken at a convention that year, hundreds of thousands
of such people of all ages became "Jewish" according to the
Reform movement.
Even if we accepted the most watered down criteria of what
constitutes Reform and Conservative Jewish identity, we would
quickly discover that the large numbers quoted in the NJPS as
belonging to the Reform and Conservative movements are a
fiction. Conservative and Reform each do not have more real
adherents than the Orthodox community today.
This fact, which sounds astonishing in the light of regular
statements by Reform and Conservative leaders of their large
constituencies, can be deduced from the numerous studies,
findings and articles that have appeared in Reform and
Conservative journals in recent years. The findings of the
NJPS of "1.8 million Conservative" and "2.3 million Reform"
is a bloated farce that is extremely generous to those
movements.
How Many Practicing Reform and Conservative
Are There?
In "Conservative Synagogues and Their Members, Highlights of
a North American Study" published in 1995-96 by Jack
Wertheimer, American Jewish history professor of the Jewish
Theological Seminary (Conservative), he reports the findings
of a study he did among dozens of Conservative synagogues.
Starting with the assumption that the Conservative movement
has 1,800,000 members, as per the findings of the NJPS, he
writes that only half of these officially belong to a
synagogue. Of these, in nearly half of the synagogues (42%),
only 10% attend Shabbos observance regularly. If a holiday
falls during the week, 66% of the synagogues will only have
10% attending services.
Since the elderly and middle-aged disproportionately attend
synagogue services, this means that only a small percentage
of young Conservative Jews even attend their synagogue on a
regular basis (p.43). Of those 35 and under overall, on which
the future of the Conservative movement depends, less than a
third attend at least once a month, and only 20% can be
considered highly active despite the fact they are more
educated than the elders in the movement. While 63% have had
exposure to 6 years of Jewish education or more, they tend to
be less interested and involved (p.26).
While Wertheimer doesn't give definite numbers of serious
synagogue involvement and Jewish commitment, if we assume
that 20% of ALL Conservative Jews (including those who claim
to be Conservative but don't even belong to a Conservative
synagogue) are committed religiously, we would end up with
360,000 committed and practicing Conservative Jews -- less
than the estimated Orthodox community in the U.S.
He furthermore writes that the current Conservative
population includes a disproportionate number of older
persons, who made the switch from Orthodox to Conservative
decades ago. Since then, denominational switching from the
Orthodox to Conservative has slowed to a trickle. Since "any
sizable influx from the Orthodox is unlikely in the future"
(p.37) and since Conservative retention is 73.6% (according
to the NJPS), the population of Conservative Jews is steadily
dropping.
Someone who attends university in New York told me of a young
fellow student she met who claimed he was Reform although he
had never been to a Reform temple, nor had a bar mitzva or
any kind of formal Jewish learning.
We can certainly suspect that a large number, perhaps even
the majority, of those who call themselves Reform or
Conservative do so for reasons having nothing to do with
religious or ideological identification with these movements -
- for instance, because they arranged the bar mitzva of their
children in a nearby Reform temple or Conservative
synagogue.
Wertheimer mentions (p. 102) that only 54% of all
Conservative families had four Jewish grandparents. Of the
37% of Conservative families who are mixed marriages, the
majority are young families and they probably derive from
Conservative Jews who consider themselves "Conservative" but
whose involvement in Jewish life is minimal or
nonexistent.
The Ravages of Intermarriage
Intermarriage is on the rise in the Conservative movement,
and today, many synagogues have unconverted non-Jews
attending services. Robert Gordis summarized the concern of
many Conservative colleagues already twenty years ago when he
fretted, "The Jewish community simply cannot afford to lose
thousands upon thousands of its sons and daughters without
making a yeoman effort to reduce... defections from its
ranks." (David Singer, "Living with Intermarriage", in
Commentary, July 1979, p.51)
The situation of assimilation and intermarriage in the Reform
Movement is, of course, far worse. The NJPS reports that only
30% of all Reform families (the greater percentage of which
are middle-aged couples) have four Jewish grandparents. 70%
of all couples include a non-Jewish spouse, or one who
"converted" to Judaism. In recent years, the American press
has written that the Orthodox do not consider the Reform and
Conservative members to be Jewish. Many Orthodox spokesman
respond that this is not true, that the only objections are
to their beliefs -- but that may be because the Orthodox
spokesman are less familiar with the true membership of those
movements than the secular Jews.
Extremely revealing of the actual situation among these two
movements is the evaluation in Spectator (ibid. p. 21)
of the different programs offered by the Jewish non-Orthodox
establishment to imbue their teenagers with Jewish
commitment. They give the youth movements ("20,000 active
members, although there may be up to 100,000 card-carrying
members") a C-; the overnight Jewish camps (estimated
participants: 30,000) a D+; Sunday schools a D-; afternoon
schools a D+; informal Jewish programs likes Genesis, Panim-
el-Panim (estimated participants: 4,000) a D; Israel
Experience (3,659 participants last summer) a B-; and non-
Orthodox High schools a D.
The Reform and Conservative movements together can only
muster the involvement of 60-70 thousand of their youth to
the total number of social programs they offer. Their entire
future is based upon these few young committed Jews, the only
ones who would voluntarily become involved in a Jewish
experience. If their constituents total 4.1 million as the
NJPS claims, their youth should total at least a quarter of
this number. The active involvement of about 60,000 youths
(6%) from a pool of 1 million is depressing news for these
movements and bodes poorly for their immediate future. For
many of these, too, the involvement is only a fad of
youth.
Compare this with the tens of thousands of Orthodox Jews who
are active in Pirchei and Bnos, NCSY, and Bnei Akiva and the
many thousands who travel to Israel every year to spend a
year in intensive study in yeshivas or seminaries, or summer
travel programs, where the total population is said to be
smaller than the youth of those movements.
Every journal produced by Conservative, Reform and secular
Jews analyzes the gloomy future that awaits these movements.
Hundreds of pages are written about why Jews are
intermarrying, and what can be done to stop the bloodletting.
Among the reasons given are American liberal patterns, an
enchanting and exciting gentile society which is accepting of
Jews, the fact that parents are no longer authority figures,
familial loyalties are likely to be dismissed as irrelevant,
parents abdicating their responsibility to demand
"inmarriage" from their children so as not to antagonize
them, Jewish youth's negative perception of Jewish
supplemental education, and Jewish youth activities which are
disproportionately under-attended by Jewish boys.
Trying to Reverse the Trends
Proposed suggestions to stem the tide have all failed. The
Israel Experience program proposed in 1992 by Jewish
philanthropist Charles Bronfman whose goal was to send 50,000
Jewish teens to Israel by the year 2000, fell flat on its
face. Last year, barely 3,700 Jewish teenagers could be
prevailed upon to go, and of these, most would have gone
anyway even without the incentive of his program. The
uninspired and uninterested Jewish teens who his program
meant to target could not be enticed to go. In analyzing the
failure of the program, researchers explained: "The most
basic assumption, that Israel has tremendous intrinsic appeal
for all Jews, is faulty. Therefore, attempting to recruit
young adults to participate in Israel experiences without
educating them, their parents and their Jewish role models to
the central role of Israel in Jewish identity and in
organized Jewish life is, in effect, putting the cart before
the horse." (Journal of Jewish Communal Service,
Summer, 1998, p. 211), or as one Jewish student said
pithily, "Israel is not even a blip on the radar screen of
most [non-Orthodox] New York Jews." (ibid., p. 206)
A director of Israel operations for the United Jewish Appeal
reported that the UJA missions were not as "strong" as he had
anticipated. "Even the committed people aren't coming," he
said. "More non-Jews are coming to Israel, while Jews choose
to go elsewhere. More Germans come to Israel annually than
American Jews. The Gulf War saw 25 non-Orthodox Jewish
tourist groups from New England canceled; every Christian
tour came. (Rabbi Edgar E. Siskin, American Jews; What
Next?, 1998, p. 147) In contrast to a generation ago,
today's Jews do not see the survival of Israel as pivotal to
their lives as Jews.
Nor can Reform or Conservative hope that more exciting
services at the synagogue will revitalize Jewish commitment.
For decades both movements have been trying to infuse
humanitarian and social content to their services to increase
their appeal to the masses, with at best temporary success.
"With congregations apathetic, sanctuaries vacant, Jewish
education programs a charade, and `Outreach' programs
impotent in damming the flood tide of assimilation, the
synagogue would appear a weak rampart for sustaining
survival." (ibid. p. 176)
The truth is that Reform Jews have long felt that Reform
Judaism is an institution of convenience, appreciated for its
social aspects, but not worthy of being taken seriously.
Rabbi Julius Weinberg, of Cleveland State University,
observed twenty years ago, "We are still haunted by the low
image of Reform . . . a Judaism of minimalism and
convenience . . . "
In response to the question "What is a Reform Jew?" a Reform
Confirmation student wrote, "A Reform Jew is someone who
doesn't wear a yarmulke, who doesn't light candles on
Friday night, and who goes to the Temple when he feels like
it." (ibid., p. 162)
The executive vice-president of the Central Conference of
American Rabbis (the Reform clergy organization) in
describing the "hectic" activity of the typical Reform
congregation, observes that "the one dead spot is the
sanctuary." And the reason? "The truth is most Reform Jews do
not believe that a reality exists behind the word `G-d'."
(ibid., p. 163).
@SUB TITLE = The Religious Leaders are Active
A barometer of the true Reform and Conservative sphere of
influence can be seen by the campaign waged by the U.S.
Reform and Conservative leaders against the Orthodox monopoly
of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel. Despite the invective and
threats issued from the leaders, the majority of the Reform
and Conservative members were generally unresponsive and even
uninterested. If their spiritual leaders tried to organize a
rally along the lines of the prayer rally held in Jerusalem
last month, they would be hard pressed to come up with even a
few thousand demonstrators nationwide. They can easier muster
a delegation of several dozen of their clergy to come to
Israel to lobby the government. Many suspect the reason the
Reform and Conservative leaders are trying so desperately to
get a foothold in Israel is because they realize the bell is
already tolling for their movements in America.
We took pains to quote Conservative and Reform leaders about
the situation existing in their movements. Even without these
official statements, our conclusion about the fates of these
movements can be distilled from the simple pattern we have
all observed going on all around us. Assimilation is a four
generation process. Once deviating from Orthodoxy, the next
generation goes to Conservative, the generation after that to
Reform, and the fourth generation snaps the cord that
connects it to the Jewish nation.
When Uri Rebhoun, of the Hebrew University's Department of
Contemporary Jewish Studies, explains that the most "alarming
finding" of his study on Jews' abandonment of their
denominations is the enormous rise of the nondenominational,
those of Jewish extraction who no longer identify their
religion as Jewish, he is cataloguing the end of this
inexorable process which the majority of Jews in the U.S. are
reaching in this decade.
In the 1990 NJPS, the Reform reported increased membership
from the previous decade, since they were still getting the
fallout from the Conservatives. The nondenominationals, who
are the fallout of Reform had an even greater increase, since
Reform, being the largest group of all four Jewish groups,
also suffered the greatest attrition.
In the upcoming 2000 survey, we will see the assimilation
process picking up greater momentum. Since the Conservative
numbers have been dropping continuously for three decades
because they have only received a minuscule influx from the
Orthodox during this time, the fallout from their ranks into
Reform will be relatively small. The greatest fallout will
occur in Reform, and we will see huge numbers leaving their
ranks for the nondenominationals.
If the organizers of the 2000 National Jewish Population
Survey prepare the questionnaires so that the unaffiliated
and uncommitted cannot filter into the ranks of the Reform
and Conservative as they did in the 1990 NJPS, we would not
be surprised to find that the Conservative and Reform
movements together comprise not more than half a million
each, with only a small and decreasing percentage of truly
involved Jews. They can do this by asking respondents
explicit questions such as, "With which group do you most
closely identify with ideologically?" and "Whose practices do
you observe in day-to-day life?" instead of an overly
simplified and non-committing question such as, "Are you
Reform, Conservative or nondenominational?"
These Federation executives have every reason, though, to
evade such a direct approach. It is in their interest to come
up with as large a number of Jews as possible to claim a
constituency on which they can continue their political
activism and national influence. "For the near future, there
may not be dramatic loss of Jewish population. Jewish
identity will be undergoing continuous redefining, so that
any who never before would have been defined as Jews will now
qualify. Children of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother
will now pass muster as Jews. Individuals converted according
to the minimal standards of some rabbis will be counted as
Jews. So will `cultural converts' who identify with the
Jewish people while still retaining their Christian faith.
`Happy sociologists' will cast a net of vast width and small
mesh in order to snare their questionable Jewish catch."
(American Jews, p. 109)
This occurs right now with so-called "Russian" and
"Ethiopian" Jews who are still being airlifted to Israel with
the support of the Jewish state and American Jews, despite
the fact that the vast majority are gentiles with at most
some Jewish blood in them.
Reform and Conservative are thus inexorably heading in the
same direction as the early Christians, the Sadducees, and
the Karaites. These deviant groups were part of mainstream
Judaism for close to 200 years. After oscillating
ideologically for several decades, they eventually took their
rightful place in the non-Jewish world or placed themselves
beyond the pale of normative Jewry. Because the Karaites
maintained geographical integrity, they were able to preserve
their existence as a separate group, but even their practices
were much more demanding than the current heretical
movements.
Reform and Conservative Jewry, who have no compunctions about
intermarriage, and are spread out throughout the U.S., are
unlikely to retain their separate identity. Within one, or at
most two generations, we will see the institutional demise of
these two movements, or perhaps their conglomeration with a
universal religious movement like the Unitarians who do not
subscribe to the more particularistic elements in
Christianity. A humanistic congregation that applied to join
the Reform synagogue movement was rejected, but the move was
not without serious controversy.
We Have to Mourn the Losses; Not Exult in
Them
As Orthodox Jews, we should not feel triumphant at the loss
of these segments to the Jewish nation. They are the
descendants of G-d-fearing Jews no less than we are; they are
our cousins and relatives. A penetrating look at their
situation where so many have stepped through the door and are
in the last minutes of slamming the door shut should arouse
in us emotions of mourning, not jubilation.
If Orthodox Jews have made an amazing comeback after
suffering losses for 200 years, we have not ourselves to
thank and admire, but zechus Ovos, those pioneers who
rebuilt Torah in America with tremendous self-sacrifice, and
the promise of Hashem, Elokei Yisroel, of the eternity of our
nation.
End of Part I
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