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Opinion & Comment
Who Goes First? A Look At Some Of The Halachic Issues Involved In Waiting In Line

by HaRav Yitzchok Silberstein with Rabbi Tzvi Yabrov

Introduction

There are many areas of life where waiting in line is unavoidable. When there are a number of applicants for treatment, for services or for assistance, they are usually attended to on a first-come-first-served basis. This article deals with whether and under what circumstances, it may be justified to put a later arrival ahead of others in line. In the course of the discussion, the halachic basis for the whole idea of waiting in line is examined.

First, some common questions relating to queue-jumping.

1. May one accede to the request of a sick patient, whose condition is not dangerous, to put him ahead of other patients who are waiting in line?

2. May one move a patient to the front of a queue of people who are waiting for minor surgery, e.g. hernia or eye operations, when it is certain that the postponment will not cause any danger to the others?

3. Reuvein tenders a request for government assistance, or for a loan from a gemach, and is told that he must wait in line. Since he is friendly with the clerk or the gabbai who processes the applications, Reuvein asks his friend to put him at the front of the line. May his friend grant this request, even though it will certainly mean further delay for others in having their needs met?

4. Reuvein just needs to buy a stamp from the teller at the post office, while all those in front of him in line have lengthier business to conduct. May the teller accede to Reuvein's request to sell him his stamp first?

5. Reuvein is hurrying to shacharis, but he must first bring home some groceries. When he comes to the cash desk to pay, he finds a long line of schoolchildren there. If he waits for all of them to finish, he will miss the minyan. May he go to the head of the queue, or will he be stealing their time by so doing, rendering his subsequent tefilloh an abomination?

6. Is a store owner allowed to attend first to the purchases of a wealthy and valuable client, and leave those in front of him in line, to wait?

One general point needs to be made before discussing the issues which these questions involve. If one of the conditions of a doctor's employment is that he treats patients in the order of their registration or arrival, he may certainly not make any changes, for this would be breaking the agreement which his employer made with him. This can be assumed to be a condition of employment in the case of government-funded hospitals, or any government office that deals with the public.

In the case of Kupat Cholim (HMOs -- health organizations whose services are partly paid for by patients' dues), tampering with the queue also involves depriving patients of privileges which they have paid for. The first two questions are therefore only relevant in the context of a private medical clinic. Similarly, the third question would also only be relevant in the case of a gemach. May a later applicant be placed before an earlier one?

In Beis Din and at the Doctor's Office

We find the following halochoh in Choshen Mishpot, siman 15:1- 2: "A dayan must give precedence to judging the case that came before him first, however, he must give precedence to the case of a talmid chochom, even if he came at the end . . . If there are many cases before him, the case of an orphan is given precedence over the case of a widow and the case of a widow over the case of a talmid chochom. The case of a talmid chochom comes before the case of an am ho'oretz (see Shach se'if koton 3: `. . . there are grounds for each of them to be first, therefore those grounds which involve Torah's honor are preferred. In addition, we wish to minimize bitul Torah (and the Rambam writes (Horiyos) that the reason is that the talmid chochom benefits the nation immensely) and the case of a woman comes before the case of a man."

Is this order of preference only applicable to dayonim, or will it be the same where the parties are waiting in line to visit the doctor? A related question was posed by the Aderes zt'l (who was rov of Yerushalayim), who writes, "While I was in Dublin, I went to consult a doctor. As I was preparing to go inside the doctor's room, a woman suddenly entered the passage and claimed that she had already waited there, and had just gone out for a moment. I did not know that she had already been there and I decided that in any case, I took precedence, because `the command of honoring Torah is certainly preferable.' One would have to reflect however, whether this would also apply in the case of a widow. I was in doubt about a case where the second arrival is more sick than the first, whether he would take precedence, or whether we would still say first-come-first- served" (From a manuscript stored in Ponevezh Yeshiva).

Understanding the Issues

Two questions are thus posed by the Aderes: First, does a widow go before a talmid chochom while waiting for the doctor? And second, does a sicker patient go before a healthier one, even though the latter arrived first? The two ways of looking at the first question can be explained as follows:

The reason that the case of a widow or an orphan is generally heard first may be that beis din has a general responsibility to protect their monetary interests -- "Judge [on behalf of] the orphan, take issue [on behalf of] the widow" (Yeshayoh 1:17). Having their dispute heard first acts as a counterbalance to any handicap in arguing their case properly that may result from their personal sorrows. According to this, the Chochmas Shlomo argues that the halochoh would only apply where the widow or orphan is the plaintiff, not where they are the defendant.

In a similar vein, the Oruch Hashulchon (se'if koton 2), deduces that this halochoh would not apply if the orphan's interests are being supervised by a guardian who appears in beis din on his behalf. The Pischei Teshuvoh also brings an opinion that holds this way. By the same token, there would be no reason to let a widow or an orphan go first in line while waiting for the doctor.

According to the understanding of the author of sefer Haflo'oh (in his chiddushim to Choshen Mishpot (siman 15) however, a widow may come before a talmid chochom even in the line to see a doctor. The Haflo'oh asserts that a talmid chochom takes precedence over an orphan but not over a widow. Although this sounds strange (because the orphan himself goes before a widow, who goes before a talmid chochom), the Haflo'oh explains as follows: The reason that an orphan takes precedence over a widow is not because his distress is greater than hers. It is because the beis din act on behalf of all orphans and they have a responsibility to actively seek their benefit. This obligation is the beis din's alone; it is not binding on the talmid chochom, who therefore takes precedence because of Torah's honor.

The reason that the widow goes first however, is because of her grief, and the obligation to compensate for this by letting her go first applies to the talmid chochom in the same way that it applies to the dayonim. According to this, a talmid chochom may have to let a widow go before him in line to see the doctor as well, because of her crushed spirit. The doubt expressed by the Aderes may be over which of these possibilities is correct.

Finding the Best Arrangement

The questions posed by the Aderes can apparently be resolved through a passage in the Meiri's commentary to Sanhedrin (32). The Meiri writes, "There are certain situations which are not governed by [a fixed set of] obligations, but in which one must pursue the most correct course and compel one of the parties to act in a way in which he is not [expressly] obliged, in the interests of reaching the best possible compromise.

"This is what Chazal referred to when they said, "One posuk says, " . . . Betzedek tishpot amisecho, (Judge your comrade favorably)" (Vayikro 19:15), while another posuk says, "Tzedek tzedek tirdof . . . (Pursue the most just path)" (Devorim 16:20). Here (i.e. the first posuk), it refers to the actual law, and here it refers to compromise.

"How so? Two boats pass along a river and they meet. If they both [try to] go at the same time, they will sink [because the river is not wide enough]. However, if one goes after the other [waiting to the side until the first one goes], they can both pass. Similarly, two camels that were going up ma'alos Beis Choron [a narrow mountain trail] and met each other. If they both [try to] go [together], they will fall down. If one goes after the other, they can both go up.

"What do we do? If one of them is laden and the other is not, the one that is not should give way to the one that is. If one of them is near the city and the other is far, the one that is near should give way to the one that is far. If they are both near, or both far, or both laden, or both not laden, they should come to some compromise [about which will stand aside for the other] and [the] one [that will be going first] should pay something to the other one.

"It is the same in any such situation. Whichever party we see is better able to endure the delay, should give way to the other side. Thus, a healthy person should give way to a sick person, and the like.

"And they also said this regarding hearing cases in beis din. If there are many disputants before a dayan, an orphan comes before a widow, a widow comes before a talmid chochom, a talmid chochom before an am ho'oretz and a woman before a man, because her embarrasment is greater. If all of them were equal, whoever arrived first, is heard first."

Who Gives Way?

The Aderes' questions can be resolved in the light of the Meiri's comments. First, whoever is least able to endure the wait, goes first, the source in the Chumash for which, according to the Meiri, is the posuk "Pursue the most just path . . . " A gemora in Megilloh (29) lends support for the Meiri's application of this posuk. The gemora tells us that, "[The two amoro'im] the fathers of Shmuel and Levi, were sitting in the beis haknesses of [the town named] Shof Veyosiv. The Shechinoh came and they heard a sound. They got up and left. Rav Sheshes, who was blind, did not leave. The mal'ochim came and scared him so that he would leave.

He said to Him, "Ribbono Shel Olom, if one is wretched and the other is not, who should be pushed aside for whom?"

Hakodosh Boruch Hu said to the mal'ochim, "Leave him alone."

See also the sefer, Kesef Hakodoshim (Choshen Mishpot, siman 66), who writes that a dayan should give precedence to a case involving the restoration of domestic harmony over a monetary dispute. He cites Moshe Rabbenu's instructions to the tribes of Gad and Reuvein as an allusion to this point: "Build yourselves cities for your children and [only afterwards] enclosures for your flocks" (Bamidbor 32:24). The distress endured by an absence of domestic harmony is greater than that caused by monetary disputes.

From the Meiri we also see that a widow comes before a talmid chochom in other situations apart from beis din, this being part of the principle derived from the posuk, "Pursue the most just path . . . " Although the order of precedence in beis din is a proper obligation upon the dayonim, apparently not merely because it is the best compromise, and one could therefore ask how other situations can be derived from it, it seems that the Meiri understood that the reason for an orphan or a widow's precedence in beis din is their fragile emotional state, making it incumbent upon beis din to support them. This logic can then be extended to all other situations, in which an orphan or a widow should be helped and supported by going first.

End of Part I


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